The Imperial Japanese Army

When you consider the Japanese army of 1937 the first concept that should come to mind is modernization. The Japanese army went from the technological equivalent of the 17th century in 1867 to the point of defeating the Tsarist Russian army in the Russo – Japanese war of 1904-1905 . It was the Russians under a backward imperial regime and the Russians were at the end of a long Siberian supply line but it was still a monumental achievement.

This voluntary act of wrenching modernization was still under way in 1937 but the Japanese army was falling behind Japan’s Navy and its Air Force in the modernization race. Still, they were more than a match for the Chinese in a stand up fight and this was both a blessing and a curse since being more than a match for the Chinese did not prepare them for the Russians in 1938 and 1939. Even less were they ready for the Americans in 1941-45, a reformed British army in 1944-45, and a Russian army fresh off its victory over the Germans in 1945.

The Japanese army of the 1930’s was no more than in the middle of the pack of major powers. Their strength was in their infantry which possessed a martial spirit, a capacity for enduring physical hardship and a 99% basic literacy rate. This last meant that both instruction and indoctrination could be in writing.

Japanese soldiers were told that war was the highest expression of culture and civilization. They were also told “Fight hard. If you are afraid of dying you will die in battle; if you are not afraid, you will not die.” This was an all too simplistic version of the advice to the Samurai of the pregunpowder era that your best chance of survival was to suppress your fear of death which could only hinder you and concentrate on fighting technique to insure victory and survival. Finally they were instructed “Under no circumstances become a straggler or a prisoner of war. In case you become helpless, commit suicide nobly.”

The Japanese army was always a little short in the quality of its equipment. Bolt action rifles, machine guns that fired more slowly, smaller amounts of artillery, lighter caliber artillery; these were the consistent patterns compared with the better European armies. One area where they did excel was mortars and light field guns for direct fire support. This helped them a lot in their battles in Southeast Asia in 1941-42.

Two areas where they fell short in absolute terms were armor and antiaircraft artillery. In armor they were perhaps on a par or even slightly behind the Italians. They formed their first tank company in 1931, their first tank brigade in 1934 and a total of four armored divisions during the war. Even the Italians formed five armored divisions and more regularly employed their armored and motorized troops in concentrated groups.

With rare exceptions the Japanese employed their tanks in small groups in direct support of their infantry. They had very limited quantities of antiaircraft artillery. Conditions in China provided no incentive for improving either of these circumstances.

In terms of numbers the Japanese army in July of 1937 numbered 462, 000. This translated into 17 divisions in China plus units in Japan and Korea. The Japanese also possessed 1.5 million fully trained reserves and an additional 2.5 million partially trained. These were rapidly called upon as the war in China expanded. By the time of Pearl Harbor the Japanese had 35 of 51 divisions in China as well as 38 of 39 independent brigades.

The relatively small number of Japanese troops initially in China is made even more clear when you consider that the Japanese army viewed the Soviet Union as a major threat and kept the elite units of its Kwantung army ready to fight the Soviets if necessary. Japanese reservists did the larger share of the fighting in the North China campaigns and gained experience for future battles. This fact also supports the case that the Japanese did not possess a master plan for conquest at the start of the war with China. Rather they allowed themselves to be drawn in by a series of incremental decisions and non-decisions. This is not a good way to run a war or conduct a foreign policy as subsequent events were to show.