The Battle of Britain

This post is a bit belated-real life intervened again. On August 15, 1940 the Germans launched a massive air offensive against Britain with Eagle Day, a day of maximum Luftwaffe effort which saw almost 1,800 sorties against the British Royal Air Force and its airfields. ( A “sortie” is one flight by one aircraft.) While German air raids had begun in July, Eagle Day marked the beginning of the critical phase of the Battle of Britain as intended precursor to a German seaborne invasion. The intended result of this air campaign was to defeat the RAF thereby gaining air superiority over the English coast so as to be able to launch a successful invasion of England across the English Channel. The Germans would use their air superiority first to defeat the British navy as it tried to destroy the invasion forces at sea and then to support the land battle.

Something to remember is how new this all was. The British were using radar to plot fighter intercepts and while the Germans made a brief attempt to destroy the British radar installations it was a weak almost accidental effort against a vitally important target. The British were also reading Luftwaffe radio traffic using the Ultra code breaking intercepts which informed them of Luftwaffe plans at the operational level. The Germans attacked British airbases – to destroy or damage airfields and facilities to be sure but almost as much to draw the British fighters into battle with the intention of wearing them down. Air campaigns had an element of attrition to them. The supply and replacement of aircraft and more importantly the supply of trained pilots would be a crucial factor in success or failure. The British had the advantage that if a pilot bailed out of a downed aircraft he would land in friendly territory and could fly again while downed German pilots and crew became prisoners of war. Exactly when you had acquired air superiority sufficient to launch an invasion, how effective aircraft would be in protecting an invasion force at sea and other important questions had no clear answers at the time.

On August 17, 1940 the Germans declared a blockade of Britain by both air and sea warning that neutral shipping bound for Britain risked destruction. It is also worth noting that today is the 70th anniversary of the British evacuating their East African colony of British Somaliland in the face of Italian invasion. British Somaliland was in an isolated position and the British chose to strike the Italian East African colonies and Italian occupied Ethiopia using more logistically established and better located areas such as Kenya. The war in East Africa marked a further territorial spread of this increasingly “world” war.

British Attack French Fleet

On July 3, 1940 the British attacked units of the French navy at Oran and Mers-el-Kebir in what was then French Algeria. Within the week they would also launch a crippling carrier based air strike against a French battleship in Dakar, West Africa and pressure French ships based in Alexandria, Egypt to “demilitarize” effectively disarming themselves to the point where the British would notice and be able easily to stop them if they tried to leave.

The attack on Mers-el-Kebir was one of the most controversial and bitter episodes of the war. Over 1,200 French sailors were killed and although the battle cruiser Strasbourg escaped to Toulon several other French capital ships were sunk or disabled along with other lighter ships and several submarines. The Vichy French bombed Gibraltar in retaliation (doing very little damage) and actually considered declaring war on Britain but decided France had had enough war for now. Thus the British made a major step forward to seeing that no significant elements of the French navy would fall into German or German allied hands. They also added another chapter to their history of successful ruthless and daring naval accomplishments.

Strange Victory, Strange Defeat

Before he was killed by the Nazi’s for his work in the French resistance movement, the French historian Marc Bloch wrote a short book called “Strange Defeat” in which he sought an explanation for what at the time seemed an inexplicable French failure to defend themselves successfully or at least for a protracted period of time from German attack. Bloch emphasized that the allies were overconfident, that the Germans achieved surprise and that the allies were unduly influenced by a desire to keep casualties low. He also noted how slow the French command system was when it came to making and implementing a decision. For someone writing during the war without free access to the usual historical sources Bloch did a much better job of explaining things than the conventional wisdom of the time which could be summarized as – the Germans used “blitzkrieg” to overcome the decadent French. It has taken decades of chipping away at this conventional wisdom to get back to and build upon Bloch’s analysis.

In 2000, Ernest R. May’s book “Strange Victory” was published-the title being a tip of the hat to Bloch’s earlier work. May elaborated on the strangeness noting that the allies possessed more men, more artillery, and more (and better) tanks than the Germans. A critical contribution of May was to explain in depth the origins of the “Manstein Plan” i.e the thrust through the allegedly impassable Ardennes forests which cut off and surrounded the substantial and qualitatively better portion of the French army which charged into Belgium intent on blocking an anticipated German flanking movement through northern Belgium – a repetition of the German strategy in world war I.

It was not a simple case of future German Field Marshall Erich von Manstein coming up with a clever idea which was then adopted by Hitler because it appealed to Hitler’s instincts for the unorthodox and the attack. Manstein got help both in the plan’s development and in by-passing organizational obstacles to get it in front of Hitler. While Hitler was predisposed to like this kind of thing, acceptance of the plan overall was greatly assisted by the work of German military intelligence which first, detected in the French dispositions the intent to drive into Belgium, second detected and took into account the inflexibility of the French decision making process and third tested the “Manstein plan” through a series of war games where it was assumed that French reaction time would be slow. The war games showed that the plan would be a success even though French reaction times were faster in the war games than they proved to be in the event.

John Mosier’s book “The Blitzkrieg Myth” does a good job of explaining that the Germans had a long tradition of distinguishing between a mobile “war of maneuver” and a more static “war of positions”. German doctrine viewed maneuver warfare as the decisive form and called for the creation of conditions favorable to maneuver whenever possible. This doctrine covered France’s defeat in 1870 by German marching infantry and horse drawn artillery as effectively as it covered France’s defeat in 1940 by German motorized forces and Stuka dive bombers. A German elaboration on Mosier’s argument specific to 1940 can be found in Karl-Heinz Frieser’s “The Blitzkrieg Legend”.

An early issue of Strategy & Tactics magazine (#27?) contains a table which shows that, man for man, the French did approximately the same damage to the Germans as did the Russians in the first six weeks of the German invasion of Russia in 1941. This suggests that factors other than “decadence” were involved in the French defeat. No one ever accused Stalin’s Russia or its military of decadence yet they performed no better than the French in their first encounter with the Germans.

On the issue of blitzkrieg, the revisionism discussed above can be carried too far. The German air force was numerically superior to the allies at the front and did a much better job of supporting the land battle. German tanks may have had thinner armor and lighter guns than allied tanks but they were generously equipped with radios facilitating maneuver and reaction speed and were used in masses which assured numerical superiority at the decisive point of contact. German air ground cooperation, much of it improvised for the campaign, was the most advanced in the world at the time. It was the tank, the airplane, the internal combustion engine and the radio that provided the Germans with the tools to restore maneuver to their campaigns.

Still, now that we have some emotional distance from events, it is possible to acknowledge how confident the allies were in 1940 and the many ways in which that confidence was justified. Similarly we can now recognize the German victory as a feat of arms well within the zone of historical and doctrinal tradition rather than a product of some vague and invincible hi-tech novelty. This in turn leads to the conclusion that the outcome of the campaign and subsequent history could have been very different. Almost as bitter as defeat is the knowledge that your fate was truly in your own hands.

The Fall of France

On June 21st, 1940 France surrendered to Germany. The Germans insisted that the surrender documents be signed in the same railroad car where the German surrender took place in 1918. Hitler was personally present for the ceremony and there was a bit of allied propaganda, absurd by today’s standards, which purported to show Hitler “dancing a jig” in celebration at the ceremony. It was actually news reel footage of Hitler walking while the film ran at a fast speed forwards, then backwards then forwards again. I can personally testify that this film was still being shown as if it was a true depiction of events in the late 1950’s.

The fall of a major victorious power from world war I was a shock and a surprise. I used to ask my father, a world war II Marine, all sorts of questions about his war experiences. One day it occurred to me to ask my stepmother what she remembered about the war. She paused and thought for a moment and said, “We were all surprised when France fell.” (Later she told me a story about the days immediately after Pearl Harbor but I’ll save that for next year.)

This spectacular German success temporarily put an end to the plots of the German generals against Hitler. It could no longer credibly be said that Hitler was putting the country on the road to ruin. The victory also caused Hitler’s popularity with the German people to soar. Thus he was free to concentrate on plotting the invasion of Russia thereby putting Germany back on the road to ruin.

The terms of the treaty were generous by Hitler’s standards. Northern and western France became German occupied zones. The interior and the south coast were placed under the control of a collaborationist government with its capital at Vichy which came to be known as Vichy France. However, the idea of being a collaborationist was not a widely understood one at the time and many French people simply accepted Vichy as the lawful French government. There was probably some rationalization going on here. If Vichy was the lawful government then as a French person you could accept the idea that the war was over for you.

Of course many French people did not buy this reasoning at all. Most notable among them was a French army colonel Charles deGaulle who founded the Free French movement intended to rally all French people who wished to continue the fight. More on him later.

Vichy France also included the French colonies. This greatly disappointed Mussolini who was told by Hitler that there would be no French North African colonies in Italy’s future. The immediate issue for Britain was the future of the French navy. It belonged to Vichy but this did not adequately assure the British that it would not fall into German hands.

At the time the only way the allies and their sympathizers could explain this disaster was to say that the Germans used “blitzkrieg” tactics to gain their victory. They might as well have said the Germans used magic beans as this would have been an almost equally enlightening explanation. Only after some emotional distance has been achieved through the passage of time are we beginning to understand what happened. Expect a mini-essay on this issue soon.

Germans March Into Paris

On June 14, 1940, a little more than a month after they had launched their invasion, the Germans captured Paris. The French had declared Paris an “open city” which is a military convention whereby one side agrees not to defend a city so as to avoid the destruction that inevitably occurs when a city is actively defended. A city can be a very powerful defensive position as Warsaw had shown and other European cities would demonstrate in the future. However, if the defense of the city is not part of an integrated plan the resulting destruction and death have little point. The Poles could expect no mercy from the Germans and staked their national future on all out resistance. The French could expect better treatment and, in any event, by now lacked the cohesion to organize major resistance around Paris. It was probably just as well.

Meanwhile another advocate of all out resistance was at work. It has been little noted that Winston Churchill harbored a fantasy of some kind of last redoubt in the Breton or Norman peninsulas and was at this time still sending troops into France through Breton and Norman ports to accomplish this end. He even committed the recently arrived 1st Canadian infantry division which could have formed a nice nucleus for the ground forces to defend Britain against possible invasion. The result was a confused muddle, a hasty evacuation, more destroyed and abandoned equipment and a “second Dunkirk” involving the evacuation of over 200,000 men including, not incidentally, 24,500 Poles.

Italy Invades France

On June 10, 1940 Italy invaded France declaring war on France and Britain. As hard pressed as they were the French easily stopped the Italian attack after it had progressed only a few miles. Italy was not ready for war but Mussolini couldn’t resist the temptation to jump in and try to claim a share of the spoils in what looked like a sure thing.

Meanwhile in response to a renewed German offensive, which had begun as soon as the Dunkirk evacuation ended and was gathering steam, the French government began evacuating Paris and started setting up a temporary capital in Tours. This German attack was, of course, the real threat to France. The French army fought more effectively during this phase of the campaign but its earlier losses were too great for this to affect the final outcome.

I have not found any serious treatments in English of the Italian decision to enter the war. The immediate impact was to spread the war to the Mediterranean and to Africa. It is not clear to me if Italy had any well considered war aims. The results would be anything but what Mussolini envisioned and Mussolini would end up paying with his life for some serious bad judgment on his part.

Norway Surrenders

On June 9, 1940 after two months of resistance the Norwegian army high command ordered an end to resistance. By this time, the British and French had completed the evacuation of Narvik and a Norwegian government in exile complete with a small army, navy and air force organization had been established in Britain. Very importantly, approximately 85% of the very large Norwegian merchant fleet escaped with its crews. This fleet became the main source of income for the Norwegian government in exile. Although there was some friction arising out of financial interests and concerns of national sovereignty, as a practical matter Norwegian merchant ships became a valuable addition to the allied war effort. There was an active Norwegian resistance to the German occupation including armed partisans and individual Norwegians volunteered for service in the RAF and British commando units.

I should also note that the day before the British aircraft carrier Glorious and two destroyers were sunk by the German battleships Scharnhorst and Gneisenau and the heavy cruiser Hipper. These ships sank an oil tanker and a troop transport as well. They had been sent on a mission to assist the relief of Narvik and sink any ships in the harbor but had run into the allied evacuation instead. It was a testimony to the continued allied confusion that the Germans were undetected until they began sinking ships and that available British capital ships were not deployed to cover the evacuation. On the other hand, the two British destroyers escorting the Glorious, Ardent and Acasta, upheld British naval tradition vainly sacrificing themselves in an effort to save the Glorious. They even inflicted a torpedo hit on the Scharnhorst. The British were lucky as the Germans could have done a lot more damage.

Norway would continue to play a significant role as the war continued.

Allies Evacuate Narvik

After much struggle to take Narvik, the allies began evacuating the Norwegian port city by sea on June 7, 1940. With Norway in the midst of surrendering and having established a government in exile in Britain, little could be gained by holding Narvik for much longer. Narvik had to be evacuated before land based German aircraft established complete air superiority in northern Norway.

Dunkirk Evacuation Ends

On June 4, 1940 the British completed the evacuation of their forces from Dunkirk. Over 338,000 troops were evacuated including a little over 100,000 French soldiers. Another 40,000 French soldiers covered the evacuation before surrendering on the morning of June 4th. The British lost six destroyers sunk. The French lost three. Various numbers are given for the number of evacuation craft lost. The number appears to be over 200 although only nine of them were large ships. The British had the better of the air fighting shooting down 240 German aircraft for a loss of 177.

The British left a large amount of heavy equipment behind including 2,450 artillery pieces, anti-tank and anti-aircraft guns and 75,000 vehicles. The loss of all this equipment was a problem but even in the dire circumstances of 1940 where equipment was in short supply the evacuation of the men was the avoidance of an even greater disaster. The equipment would be replaced. The men, now combat experienced veterans accustomed to fighting together in organized military formations, could not have been replaced except by inexperienced men who would be seeing combat for the first time without benefit of the informal learning and steadiness provided by a leavening of experienced officers and men.

It was on this day that Churchill gave his “We shall fight them on the beaches…. We shall never surrender.” speech. The Dunkirk evacuation gave the British public a success to rally around when it would have been easy to conclude that the world was coming to an end. The “Spirit of Dunkirk” has been a staple of British national pride ever since. Churchill with his speech gave tangible expression to rather than created this reaction. He even felt it necessary (and safe) to say that “wars are not won by evacuations”.

The wider world was under no illusion how the war was going. In noting this May’s dismal stock market performance a commentator recently noted that this was the market’s worst May since … 1940. To make matters worse Norway, after a determined resistance, had opened peace negotiation the day before. It has been an interesting period for me writing this blog. On May 10th, the fighting begins in earnest. Less than a month later half the French army has been lost, The British forces have been reduced to a virtually weaponless and exhausted mass and Belgium and the Netherlands have surrendered with Norway soon to follow. It makes the contemporary risk of possible Greek or Hungarian sovereign debt default seem like a walk in the park.

Belgium Surrenders, Narvik Taken by the Allies

On May 28, 1940 Belgian King Leopold III ordered the surrender of the Belgian armed forces. He had no authority to do this under the Belgian constitution and the Belgian government repudiated the surrender. As a practical matter the repudiation came too late. Thus ended 18 days of Belgian resistance during which time the Belgian army fought continuously and effectively, never losing cohesion even in the face of German air superiority and tank attacks. The Belgians had even agreed to extend their front to afford the French an opportunity to break out to the south. Thus a large gap was created in the allied front line when the Belgian army surrendered. King Leopold never consulted or even warned his allies before surrendering. Unlike the King of Norway and the Queen of the Netherlands he did not go into exile apparently considering the entire allied cause lost. Although Leopold has his defenders it appears to me they shed more light on human nature than they do on the historical record.

This was also the day the allies captured the Norwegian port of Narvik. Narvik was the northernmost major port in Norway and was the port to which Swedish iron ore was transported for shipment south to Germany during the winter months when ice blocked the shorter route through the Baltic. The Germans were still advancing northward in Norway but still could not dominate the air over an area so far north. Thus the allies were able to control the sea and slowly push back the Germans by weight of numbers and naval gun support.The contrast between allied and German performance in defense was very telling. Although forced out of Narvik the Germans retreated intact and continued to hold a rectangle of territory covering the railroad between Narvik and the Swedish border with its rear safely anchored on that neutral border. They continued to fight effectively in defense using captured supplies, the fruit of occasional long distance air drops and what could effectively be brought over the Swedish border characterized, legitimately or not, as “humanitarian” supplies which could be allowed by Sweden without legally affecting Sweden’s neutral status. Hitler was later to incorporate Narvik into his rhetoric anytime he wished to call for determined defense against the odds.