Polish Counteroffensive Defeated

As noted earlier, Poland launched a counterattack on September 9th against the northern flank of the German Army Group South i.e. a portion of the German eighth army advancing from the west. The initial attack met with some success as it hit a relatively thin screen of German infantry on flank protection duty. The Germans committed more and more troops first to stem the Polish advance and then to cut off and surround the attacking Polish forces. By September 12th the Polish attack had been halted and by the 15th Polish forces were attempting to avoid encirclement and break out toward Warsaw and Modlin. Only a few made it and the remaining Polish forces were destroyed or captured in the following few days.

The Polish attack did temporarily take the pressure off of Warsaw. 29 German divisions were committed in whole or in part to the defense and subsequent encirclement operations. German air power was committed on a large scale as well. Now Warsaw is on the brink of encirclement as the Germans regroup to focus on Warsaw.

Battle of Changsha

After months of sporadic and indecisive fighting, hampered by the need to battle the Russians in the north and continued and undiminished Chinese resistance to the south, the Japanese resume their offensive in China. On September 13th, 1939 the Japanese launched a major attack aimed at the capture of the Chinese city of Changsha. Changsha was the capital of Hunan Province and was a major agricultural, transportation and population center.

Fortunately for the Chinese the city was protected by an extensive area of hill country of the type that the Chinese had already shown themselves to be adept at using for defense. The Chinese concentrated fifty divisions and built multiple lines of defense. The Chinese are running out of space to withdraw and are determined to make a stand. In theory this is an opportunity to strike a crushing blow against an enemy which though superior in numbers lacks airpower and artillery and which has always ultimately been forced to abandon the battlefield in the past. We’ll see what happens.

Germans Reach the Outskirts of Warsaw

On the ninth day of their attack the Germans reached the Warsaw suburbs. An initial effort to attack into the city was driven back with heavy losses including a number of tanks. Still, the Germans had plenty to be optimistic about. By the second day they had achieved general air superiority. Their Panzer forces, previously untested in actual combat on this scale, were performing well. They had broken through the Polish linear defenses and overrun Danzig and the Polish corridor.

On this day the Poles mounted a counterattack against the left flank of the German 8th army. This army was covering the flank of the German 10th army which was carrying out the main drive on Warsaw from the west. The Poles considered the 8th army’s left flank exposed but by the same standard the attacking Polish forces could be considered threatened with encirclement. The developing situation made clear, to the extent it wasn’t so from the beginning, that Poland could not hold out for long without help from her allies.

What help did the allies provide? British naval forces could only influence the land war over a long period of time via blockade and convoy. Early British air operations consisted mostly of leaflet drops and attacks on German shipping. The British expeditionary force, only two divisions at this time, was still in transit to France and the front. The French had 85 of their soon to be over 100 divisions on the Franco-German border. Two days earlier they had launched an “offensive” in the Saar region. Using nine divisions they advanced five miles on a 15 mile front capturing 20 deserted villages and stopping 3 miles short of the German Siegfried line fortifications. By September 12th the French had stopped the advance and by the 20th they were withdrawing. Total German casualties were about 200.

The French were too embarrassed not to declare war in the face of open German aggression but this attack demonstrates their ambivalence. A persistent French war weariness in the face of their losses during World War I, fear of German air attack and reluctance to provoke and fight a major ground campaign against the Germans without British help (including absorbing their share of the resulting casualties) all combined to drain the offensive spirit out of an already slow, cautious and defensive minded French high command. As a practical matter, the Poles were on their own.

Britain and France Declare War; SS Athenia Torpedoed & Sunk

On September 3, 1939 Britain and France declared war on Germany. Australia, New Zealand and India did the same. It is worth noting what a wonderful thing the British Empire was for Britain even at this date. These countries had a rapidly evolving “dominion status” within the empire. Their foreign policies were independent as of 1931 or perhaps a few years earlier although there were still some who argued about this. Still, these countries for the most part wanted the benefits of being allied with what they still thought of as a great power and the head of the greatest empire in the world. Canada and South Africa also declared war within a week. Ireland remained neutral.

12 hours after the declaration of war, the German U-boat U-30 torpedoed the British passenger liner SS Athenia. Athenia became the first British ship to be sunk in World War II with a loss of 118 lives including 28 Americans. What looked like a German leap into unrestricted submarine warfare was actually a mistake. Hitler was still hoping for ultimate reconciliation with the British provided he was recognized as master of continental Europe. Accordingly, he had placed substantial restrictions on German submarine attacks in accordance with international law which remained very burdensome to a country wishing to wage an effective submarine campaign against merchant shipping. The attack on the Athenia was a clear violation of Hitler’s orders.

An account of the whole affair can be found here . An account more oriented to the perspective and challenges of the German U-boat commanders can be found here .

Germany Invades Poland

On September 1, 1939, seventy years ago today, Germany invaded Poland. By this act, Germany launched Europe in a quick descent into the bloodiest six year period in its history. Many countries outside of Europe, not least the United States, were also drawn into the conflict.

By this time the German army had been built up to the level of 102 divisions. These included six panzer (armored) divisions, four light divisions, four motorized infantry divisions and three mountain divisions. The rest were infantry divisions which relied on walking men and horse-drawn transport for artillery and supplies. Many of the infantry divisions were composed of reservists and lacked a full complement of heavy weapons and equipment such as artillery and transport. I will be saying more about German army organization and what each type of division looked like in a later post. For now though I will just note that the “light” divisions were composed of a reduced amount of motorized infantry supplemented by light tanks plus a full complement of artillery, recon, signals etc. These four divisions were later upgraded to panzer divisions.

For the invasion the Germans used all their panzer, light, motorized and mountain divisions and 38 of the best of their infantry divisions. They added five more infantry divisions during the campaign for a total of sixty divisions of all types. The remaining divisions manned the western border with France. The Germans planned to defeat Poland quickly before any Anglo-French offensive could make serious progress in the west.

The Germans divided their invasion force into two army groups. Army Group North (two armies) attacked out of East Prussia (3rd army) and Pomerania (4th army). Army Group North had 3 panzer divisions, two motorized infantry divisions and 17 infantry divisions. Army Group South composed of the 8th, 10th, and 14th armies, attacked from the west and south on a front that ran from south of the Warta river on into the now German allied puppet state of Slovakia. (Slovakia also contributed a small force to the invasion for which it was rewarded with a small slice of Polish territory.) Army Group South had three panzer divisions, two motorized infantry divisions, the four light divisions, the three mountain divisions and the other 21 infantry divisions. A quick look at a map such as this one will show that the Germans were able to attack from three sides and on a very broad front.

To defend themselves the Poles had a standing army of 28 infantry divisions, two mountain divisions, 11 cavalry brigades and a small amount of mechanized cavalry and additional mountain infantry. All of these units were understrength during peacetime and relied on reservists to bring them up to strength. As noted in my previous post, the Polish mobilization did not begin until August 28th. it is probably the case that most of the reservists headed for the standing army divisions made it to their units. However, the Polish mobilization plan included the mobilization of 15 reserve infantry divisions. Despite extensive planning, forming whole divisions by linking up stored equipment, officer and technical cadres and thousands of reservists requires time and reasonably orderly circumstances. This effort was substantially broken up by German air attack and the rapid pace of the German ground advance.

Another bad choice the Poles had to make was whether to defend their entire border up front (making them vulnerable to armored breakthroughs and motorized encirclement) or defend farther back (giving up production, food and population resources as well as reserve mobilization capabilities). National pride meant that the Poles adopted the broad front forward defense. Thus the Poles were outnumbered by a better equipped enemy and deployed in a way that played into his hands.

The situation was no better with respect to the air forces. The Germans possessed 4,300 first line aircraft. These included 1,180 bombers, 336 dive bombers and 1,179 fighters. The rest were transports, reconnaissance, naval and miscellaneous types. The Germans used 2,300 aircraft against Poland including the great bulk of their bomber and dive bomber forces. The Poles had 900 aircraft but only 600 of these were usable for anything other than training purposes. These included 300 fighters and 150 bombers. Polish aircraft were generally less modern,slower and less well armed than their German counterparts.

Suffice it to say for now that even on the first day the Germans made territorial gains and substantial progress toward gaining and maintaining air superiority. Surprise and German quantitative and qualitative superiority weighed heavily from the start. More on the campaign as time goes on including the ways in which the still combat inexperienced Germans did not have everything their own way. Also a little, and later more still, on the myths and oversimplifications embodied in the term “Blitzkrieg”.

The Last Week of Peace in Europe

Seventy years ago today marks the last of the final seven days of peace in Europe. Readers of this blog know that Japan and China had been fighting for more than two years and that Japan and Russia were concluding another round of serious fighting. Now however the fighting is about to spread further.

In the final seven days mobilization and deployments have begun. Germany is ready with its army and air force fully mobilized and deployed. German submarines have taken up stations in the Atlantic and the Baltic. Other countries are in various states of readiness. Most notably, Poland has waited until August 30th to begin mobilization thus assuring that many of its reservists will still be en route to their assigned depots when the Germans attack. In one of a series of decisions in which there are few if any good options for the Poles they have decided that their first priority is to ensure that they are seen as the victim of German aggression. This will ensure the maximum sympathy of Britain and France. British and French intervention and effective assistance is Poland’s only long term strategic hope and so mobilization occurs at the eleventh hour.

There is really no need for further discussion or calculation as both sides are set for war. Hitler wants Poland and also wants war now. The comparative advantage he has achieved by beginning rearmament in 1933 is threatening to be eroded by the belated but growing rearmament efforts of Britain and France. For him, the worst thing that could happen is concession or conciliation efforts.

He need not worry. Poland will fight. With the example of a freshly dismembered Czechoslovakia in front of them they feel they have nothing to lose by resistance. Britain and France are also determined there will be no more concessions to Germany and they have begun their own mobilizations.

Nonetheless a final round of discussions does take place. On August 25th Britain and Poland sign a treaty of mutual assistance, any concerns that the Russians may have about such an agreement having been swept aside by their own treaty with Germany. On the same day Italy informs Germany that it will not support Germany in the coming war unless it receives an impossible level of weapons and resource assistance from Germany. The German attack, originally scheduled for August 26th, is postponed to September 1st.

Hitler uses the lull to satisfy himself that the Italian demands cannot be met, and that he does not need Italy for his coming operations. This does not take long so he also makes one more attempt to split off the British from the Poles. This effort produces nothing except for an absurd incident where the British and German ambassadors almost come to blows on the night of August 30/31 when the German ambassador refuses to provide a list of Germany’s demands on Poland.

Thus does war begin anew in Europe and tomorrow will be the day.

The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact

On August 23rd 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a 10 year non-aggression treaty in which they agreed not to attack each other and to resolve disputes by peaceful means. In a secret protocol they agreed to divide up Poland and Germany further agreed to give the Soviets a free hand regarding the Baltic States of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Four days before on August 19th a trade agreement had been signed and nine days later World War II in Europe began.

The immediate results of this agreement was that Hitler was able to wage war against the western allies, which was by now a clearly foreseeable consequence of his planned invasion of Poland, without a threat of Soviet intervention and with access via trade to Soviet raw materials and food. Stalin got more buffer territory against invasion which, to his puzzling surprise, he would need before the ten years was up.

An excellent collection of documents on Nazi-Soviet relations during this period can be found here . It includes the text of the secret protocol, the existence of which the Soviets denied until 1989. A better example of the cynical euphemisms of the bureaucratic writing style would be hard to find.

Nomonhan/Khalkhin Gol

On August 20th, 1939, the Soviets launched their biggest attack to date in the continuing “Nomonhan Incident” known to the Soviets as the battle of Khalkhin Gol. Earlier I described how the Japanese offensive of July 23rd had been defeated by massed Soviet artillery fire. This time the Soviets added tanks to the mix.

The offensive, which struck just four days before a planned attack by the Japanese, was commanded by then Lieutenant General Georgy Zhukov about whom we will hear much more in the future. Stalin was determined to resolve this front, having other matters to attend to as we shall soon see, and so Zhukov brought with him heavy reinforcements of armored and motorized forces. In all he deployed three infantry divisions, two motorized divisions, two tank divisions and two independent tank brigades all supported by over 250 aircraft.

With the three infantry divisions and a tank brigade he attacked and pinned the Japanese center. With the armored and motorized forces he then turned both Japanese flanks. The result was the encirclement and destruction of the Japanese 23rd infantry division. Japanese relief attempts failed and by August 31st it was all over. Japanese losses exceeded 70% of the forces engaged.

The Japanese were once again overmatched. While they had occasionally demonstrated a marginal superiority in quality over Soviet infantry, when that infantry was supported by tanks and artillery under a commander that understood and applied combined arms doctrine,  along with the principles of mass and mobility the result was a decisive Japanese defeat. To their credit, the Japanese ground forces never lost cohesion even in the face of their horrific casualties – casualties that would have broken a lesser force. They inflicted approximately 25,000 casualties on the Soviets while likely suffering close to double that number themselves. Nonetheless, the Japanese were fortunate that the Soviets chose not to press their advantage any further.

This battle pretty much ensured that future Japanese offensives would be directed at China and the Pacific rather than at Soviet Russia. The Japanese would not rethink their ground warfare doctrine. Realistically, they could not do so since they did not have the industrial strength to have a world class navy and air force and also have an army equipped on a German or Soviet scale.

It is interesting to me that this Soviet offensive was conducted by the same army that was seen as ineffective in the Russo – Finnish War and as having its leadership decimated by Stalin’s 1937 – 1938 purges. Moreover, it is generally thought to have lost most of its ability to conduct mobile warfare as the leading mobile warfare proponents fell victim to the purge and more conservative leadership reasserted itself. Soviet success at Khalkhin Gol may be attributed to the fact that Zhukov understood mobile warfare, survived the purges and had a leadership style that got his orders zealously followed through inspiration and , failing that, raw fear. You could sometimes fail to attain your objective, but only if you were seen to have tried very hard and the measure of your trying was your persistence and your casualty rate. As a Zhukov subordinate your career and indeed your life were at risk if you were seen to falter in pursuit of your objective.

There are a number of general accounts of the battle but a particularly revealing account, using a focus on some Japanese units is found here.

Japanese Failed Offensive at Nomonhan

On July 23, 1939 the Japanese attacked the Russians at Nomonhan, a disputed point on the Soviet border with Manchuria. This attack marked the largest battle yet in an escalating series of skirmishes that had begun back in May. I also have an earlier post on a similar border clash that occured in July of 1938.

In this attack the Japanese employed two reinforced regiments and sought to outmatch the Soviet artillery. This proved to be a losing game as the Japanese took their standard 10 day supply of artillery ammunition, doubled it and fired half of it off in two days. The Russians, without any special preparations, exceeded the Japanese artillery effort and halted the Japanese offensive almost immediately. The Japanese, seeing the immediate failure of an effort they could neither sustain nor quickly repeat, called off their attack and began drawing up plans for a new offensive in August.

The Soviets have also initiated plans for an August offensive. Who will strike first? Once again Soviet advantages in equipment and logistics have proven effective and Japanese emphases on fighting spirit and the human factor have not. We know in retrospect that Stalin took a personal interest in (and considerable offense at) these border clashes. He pretty much started the one in May and has resolved to settle matters decisively.

On July 20, 1939 the New York Times had published an editorial on the border clashes calling them “A Strange War”  raging in an obscure corner of the world “where it cannot attract a great deal of attention”.  The lessons and consequences were quickly swallowed up by larger events. However, we will pay further attention when that new August offensive rolls around.

The European Balance of Power 1938-1939

In American political rhetoric, the two great “lessons” of world war II are Munich and Pearl Harbor. Pearl Harbor is of course about vigilance and guarding against surprise and treachery. Munich is about standing up to “aggression”, bullies really, and as such may be the more visceral lesson of the two. Popular wisdom has it that if you stand up to bullies they are exposed as cowards and weaklings whereas if you give in they are emboldened and become more aggressive. This particular morality play aside, should Britain and France have stood up to Hitler in 1938? The stakes among nations in a situation such as Munich are very high and governments have always made some kind of effort to, ostensibly at least, substitute rational analysis for folk wisdom and emotion when making such high stakes decisions.

In offering an answer to this question, I will begin by setting some parameters based on what we know of the history. In considering the problem yourself you are free to accept or reject these parameters and adjust your own answer accordingly. First I assume Poland would not be drawn into any conflict; they were quite passive during the actual events. Second, the Soviet Union would stay out of it because lacking a common border with Czechoslovakia they would have had to pass troops through Poland. Poland would not have allowed this and the Soviets were not willing to go to war with both Poland and Germany. For an alternative theory on the Soviets read on till near the end. Third, Italy would have stayed out, just as they did when Hitler invaded Poland in 1939 and for the same reason – they considered themselves (quite justifiably) not ready for war with major European powers at the time. Accordingly, any resulting war is between Germany on the one hand and Britain, France and Czechoslovakia on the other.

Germany at the time had three operational panzer (armored) divisions each with over 500 tanks. On the other hand they had only a scattering of tanks bigger than the Panzer II with its 20 mm gun. The Czechs had a superior tank (the T-38) but in smaller quantities (four battalions assigned one each to four mixed cavalry/motorized divisions). The Czech frontier was heavily fortified but the Czechs had little time to extend the fortifications to cover the new common border with Germany created by the Anschluss. All major sources agree that Czechoslovakia would have fallen to the Germans in six weeks or less. The Germans would have had numerical superiority in infantry, artillery and armor. They would have had air superiority. They also would have had superior (albeit far from perfected) doctrine which would have made the most of both their numerical superiority and their superior capacity for mobile combined arms operations.

What then, of Britain and France? Britain, which in 1940 could only muster a little more than ten divisions on the continent of Europe would have had only two in 1938 and as such was a non-factor on the ground in the short run. France did little in 1939 to try and take pressure off the Poles through offensive action. There was no reason to expect them to be more aggressive in 1938. Even though German forces guarding the German western front would have been substantially weaker in 1938, this would not have energized the French committed as they were comitted to a defensive doctrine and enmeshed in a pessimistic strategic outlook.

Still, when Germany faced west it would have faced a situation in many ways worse than it faced in 1940. Germany’s rearmament program would have been inadequate to both sustain the offensive against Czechoslovakia and adequately arm the mobilizing German reserve forces that would provide the bulk of the infantry masses necessary to successfully attack the French in the west. Moreover while Germany had 10 panzer divisions in 1940 with operational quantities of Panzer III’s and the still heavier Panzer IV, they would have had only 3-6 panzer divisions in 1938. (Germany was adding panzer divisions constantly during this time albeit in some cases by reducing the number of tanks per division and cannibalizing motorized infantry divisions for their men and equipment -especially trucks.)   Thus it is possible or even likely that Germany, even with local air superiority, would have lacked the critical mass to wage successful “blitzkrieg” against the French. If so, the Allies were clearly mistaken not to have defied Hitler in 1938 even if such defiance meant war which it certainly would have.

So what were the allies thinking? First, their rearmament programs were just hitting full stride. Any analysis was haunted by a long list of unfilled ‘requirements’ which needed more time to be satisfied. Second, neither the British or the French had significant numbers of modern monoplane fighters while the Germans already had the Me-109. Finally allied analyses showed a more favorable ratio of forces in the future. (The critical mass of modern forces issue, i.e. quality vs. quantity, was largely lost on them.) By contrast, Hitler’s questions to his generals began with the assumption that the allies would eventually  outstrip the Germans. Accordingly, Hitler wanted to know the optimum time before the outstripping began. Framing the question from this German perspective tended to favor the conclusion that the war should begin now. This was one of the reasons Hitler was frustrated when the allies backed down in 1938 and why Hitler moved quickly against the rest of Czechoslovakia.

On the issue of the modern fighters, it appears that there was a critical mass issue there as well. Assuming German air superiority it is by no means certain that this tactical advantage would have had a decisive on  ground operations. Consider how the effect of air power was diminished in the context of the lower ratio of air to ground forces that was prevalent on the Russian front as the war ground on there particularly during the 1942-43 period. Even less so was the Luftwaffe likely, despite pre-war claims by the advocates of strategic bombing, to be decisive against Britain so long as France held out either indefinitely or long enough for the British Hurricane and Spitfire fighters to come on line. Even in 1940 German bomber forces lacked the weight of bombs to function as a war winning strategic air force.

Thus my verdict is that the allies were better off starting things in 1938. Time would favor the allies and the German capacity to disrupt that march of time would have been much reduced. There remains the question of the willingness of the French and British people to go to war. There is no doubt that both peoples yearned for peace and dreaded war. The impact of world war I was exacerbated by the economic and social effects of the Great Depression. Still, every indicator of public opinion that we have for the time shows repeatedly that a slim but persistent majority of citizens understood the need to resist Fascism and supported war if necessary to do so. Making the case for necessity was a demanding but far from impossible task of political leadership. Sometimes the rational quantitative analysis takes you only so far and the fate of nations must be entrusted to events and the aptly named fortunes of war.

Finally that last word on the Soviets. There is a school of thought that argues that the Soviets wanted to intervene against Germany. It is argued that they mobilized substantial forces and had even arranged for passage of forces through Romania into Czechoslovakia. Reading Stalin’s intent as well as Romania’s and Czechoslovakia’s comfort level with Soviet troops on their territory is a very speculative game. Suffice it to say that If the Soviets were willing to intervene, this would have further increased the balance of forces against Germany. Moreover, it is clear that Stalin’s attitude toward the western allies changed from a desire for a realpolitik based alliance to distrust and contempt as a result of Munich. The result was the Nazi-Soviet pact which will be covered here at the appropriate time.

If you want to delve deeper into my assumptions and conclusions I recommend you consult the following books. On the general history of the period and the case for war in 1938 see “The Change in the European Balance of Power 1938-1939: The Path to Ruin” by Williamson Murray. On the case for waiting for the numbers to change in the allies favor see the relevant chapter in “Dirty Little Secrets of World War II” by James Dunnigan and Albert Nofi. On the case for waiting for the modern fighters see the relevant chapter in “Fighter Tactics and Strategy 1914-1970″ by Edward H. Sims. Finally, for an assessment of British and French politics and public opinion see “The Dark Valley: a Panorama of the 1930s” by Piers Brendon