The Polish Campaign: Results and German Lessons Learned

Germany conquered its half of Poland in 36 days. It took almost 700,000 prisoners and inflicted over 100,000 casualties in killed, wounded and missing on the Poles. The vast quantity of captured military equipment and ammunition(e.g. over 3000 artillery pieces and 16,500 machine guns), while not suitable for use by the Wehrmacht, could be used to help equip Germany’s minor allies later in the war. By contrast German personnel losses were relatively light – a total of 40,000 including 8,000 dead. Among the 22.5 million Poles in the German occupied territory were 750,000 ethnic Germans and some ethnic minorities prepared to work against the Soviet Union e.g. Ukrainians. However, the overwhelming bulk of the population was hostile and would require an occupation force.

German equipment losses were serious and illustrated the enormous strain of building and maintaining the equipment necessary for mechanized warfare. The Germans lost over 200 tanks and over 400 aircraft. More extensive still were the deferred maintenance issues and outright mechanical breakdowns associated with the demands of combat, poor roads and maintenance and repair resources that lagged far behind the rapid advance of the mechanized ground forces and aircraft operating off of improvised airfields near the front. Many German units were virtually immobile by the end of the campaign.These issues would increase with longer campaigns and tougher opposition.

As was their custom, the Germans reviewed their operations for possible improvements with an intelligent and critical eye worthy of a better cause. They certainly had reason to be satisfied. Their armored forces had overcome earlier operational issues under combat conditions and restored the war of movement the Germans had always preferred to fight, removing the threat of world war I style trench deadlock. German artillery was highly effective. The Luftwaffe had gained air superiority and successfully attacked Polish strong points, troop movements and supply columns on a large scale.

On a more detailed level however the Germans found room for improvement. Tank and motorized units were employed conservatively and cautiously by later standards. Advocates of more aggressive armored tactics were able to build on lessons learned in Poland for later campaigns including France and Russia. The lighter German tanks were found to be useful only for reconnaissance if at all. In the future production of the heavier types would be emphasized even at the expense of the total number of tanks in a division. The mg 34 machine gun was found to be vulnerable to jamming under eastern European conditions. Research was accelerated resulting in the faster development of the more reliable and faster firing mg 42.

The Germans found that their light divisions were, well, too light for sustained combat operations. They were upgraded to Panzer divisions. On the other end of the spectrum, the motorized divisions were too hard to maneuver and control with three motorized infantry regiments. They were each reduced by one such regiment.

There were additional small improvements in battlefield communications and infantry equipment. The Germans also took note of the effective use by the Poles of night attacks and guerrilla activity in rear areas. They stressed night attacks and the combat capabilities of supply column personnel in improved training methods. One area where they learned little was camouflage discipline against air attack. That would come later as the Germans faced increasingly effective air opposition.

Much of the information from this essay is drawn from “The German Campaign in Poland (1939)” the book length Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-255 by Robert M. Kennedy which despite being published in 1956 remains a valuable source on the campaign and is packed with the kind of detail on numbers, organization, equipment and order of battle that gladdens a war game designer’s heart.

You can read it online here .

The World War II Game

As I have mentioned before on this blog, when I was in high school and college I designed a world war II game that my friends and I actually played. We played it several times with a new iteration of the design after each play and near the end we had at least the European Theater in very good shape if I do say so myself. We also played many commercial wargames on World War II battles and campaigns and part of the purpose of this blog is to recall and revive that experience and perhaps to design another iteration – one that would take advantage of fresh research on a wider variety of more accessible and higher quality sources. It also might take advantage of computer capability e.g. by using some of the concepts and techniques of the Civilization series of computer games.

For those of you who don’t want to wait for that I want to mention some commercial non-computer games that would allow you to play out some of the campaigns I have mentioned so far. The Wargamer magazine #37 had a game called “China Incident” that covered the fighting between China and Japan from 1937 to 1941. Strategy & Tactics magazine # 152 had a game on a hypothetical German invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1938. Suffice it to say that the victory conditions turned on when as opposed to whether Germany could defeat Czechoslovakia. S&T # 158 had a game on Nomonhan/Khalkin Gol. The game rules note that Conflict magazine also had a game on the July battles published in 1973. The S&T game (published in 1993) seems to me to be the more comprehensive and higher quality product. Finally the Europa Series on WW II had a game on Poland called “Case White” and there was a second edition called “First to Fight”.

Although these games are long since out of print, I suspect they turn up for sale on the internet from time to time. If anyone knows of other commercially produced games on these campaigns, please let people know about them in the comments section.

The Imperial Japanese Army

When you consider the Japanese army of 1937 the first concept that should come to mind is modernization. The Japanese army went from the technological equivalent of the 17th century in 1867 to the point of defeating the Tsarist Russian army in the Russo – Japanese war of 1904-1905 . It was the Russians under a backward imperial regime and the Russians were at the end of a long Siberian supply line but it was still a monumental achievement.

This voluntary act of wrenching modernization was still under way in 1937 but the Japanese army was falling behind Japan’s Navy and its Air Force in the modernization race. Still, they were more than a match for the Chinese in a stand up fight and this was both a blessing and a curse since being more than a match for the Chinese did not prepare them for the Russians in 1938 and 1939. Even less were they ready for the Americans in 1941-45, a reformed British army in 1944-45, and a Russian army fresh off its victory over the Germans in 1945.

The Japanese army of the 1930’s was no more than in the middle of the pack of major powers. Their strength was in their infantry which possessed a martial spirit, a capacity for enduring physical hardship and a 99% basic literacy rate. This last meant that both instruction and indoctrination could be in writing.

Japanese soldiers were told that war was the highest expression of culture and civilization. They were also told “Fight hard. If you are afraid of dying you will die in battle; if you are not afraid, you will not die.” This was an all too simplistic version of the advice to the Samurai of the pregunpowder era that your best chance of survival was to suppress your fear of death which could only hinder you and concentrate on fighting technique to insure victory and survival. Finally they were instructed “Under no circumstances become a straggler or a prisoner of war. In case you become helpless, commit suicide nobly.”

The Japanese army was always a little short in the quality of its equipment. Bolt action rifles, machine guns that fired more slowly, smaller amounts of artillery, lighter caliber artillery; these were the consistent patterns compared with the better European armies. One area where they did excel was mortars and light field guns for direct fire support. This helped them a lot in their battles in Southeast Asia in 1941-42.

Two areas where they fell short in absolute terms were armor and antiaircraft artillery. In armor they were perhaps on a par or even slightly behind the Italians. They formed their first tank company in 1931, their first tank brigade in 1934 and a total of four armored divisions during the war. Even the Italians formed five armored divisions and more regularly employed their armored and motorized troops in concentrated groups.

With rare exceptions the Japanese employed their tanks in small groups in direct support of their infantry. They had very limited quantities of antiaircraft artillery. Conditions in China provided no incentive for improving either of these circumstances.

In terms of numbers the Japanese army in July of 1937 numbered 462, 000. This translated into 17 divisions in China plus units in Japan and Korea. The Japanese also possessed 1.5 million fully trained reserves and an additional 2.5 million partially trained. These were rapidly called upon as the war in China expanded. By the time of Pearl Harbor the Japanese had 35 of 51 divisions in China as well as 38 of 39 independent brigades.

The relatively small number of Japanese troops initially in China is made even more clear when you consider that the Japanese army viewed the Soviet Union as a major threat and kept the elite units of its Kwantung army ready to fight the Soviets if necessary. Japanese reservists did the larger share of the fighting in the North China campaigns and gained experience for future battles. This fact also supports the case that the Japanese did not possess a master plan for conquest at the start of the war with China. Rather they allowed themselves to be drawn in by a series of incremental decisions and non-decisions. This is not a good way to run a war or conduct a foreign policy as subsequent events were to show.

Chiang’s German Trained Divisions

In 1937 the hard core of the Nationalist Chinese Army was the group of German trained Divisions. The typical Nationalist Chinese Division of the day was a motley group of 4,000 – 6,000 men indifferently armed and indifferently trained. They were not necessarily directly loyal to Chiang Kai-shek but instead answered to a “warlord” political ally of Chiang who might be of doubtful loyalty in the long run.

The German trained divisions on the other hand were under Chiang’s direct command, full strength and got the best equipment. The official organization of a Nationalist Chinese Division was 10,923 men organized into three infantry regiments, an artillery regiment and various supporting units e.g engineer and quartermaster battalions. The total of heavy weapons would include 328 machine guns and 46 artillery pieces. The German trained divisions actually approximated these numbers. Other divisions had less.

This did not mean the other forces were worthless. The Nationalist Chinese 29th “army” several divisions of the understrength variety is on this day 70 years ago defending Peking and environs. It has a proud history of fighting the Japanese in the various “incidents” since 1931. It’s high morale and anti-Japanese spirit is contributing to the breakdown of cease fires and negotiations that is going on. Unfortunately it has three disadvantages. First, it is understrength and under-equipped. It is probably a match for one Japanese Division if it is in defense of a strong position. Second, its position is not strong. It is scattered and unwilling to make Peking a fortress even if it had the time and resources. Third, Chiang does not trust its leader and therefore it cannot expect much help from Chiang.

What about the typical Japanese Division? In 1937 it is a very strong formation – over 20,000 men, 645 machine guns, 108 artillery pieces and a strong set of supporting units including substantial motorized transport (to supplement the over 5, 800 horses) and as many as 24 light tanks. Good training and strong logistical support mean the Japanese are able to take the offensive in a sustained way that the Chinese have a hard time matching when they can do it at all.

Chiang’s German trained hard core is typically reported as “30 divisions totaling 300,000 men”. If only. In fact 8 divisions including the Training Division were fully trained. “Training Division” should probably be rendered as “Demonstration” Division after the fashion of the German “Panzer Lehr” division and “Infantry Lehr” regiment which were composed of troops which normally served to train others but which could be committed as a combat unit if necessary. The rest of these comparatively elite divisions which in fact may have only numbered 12 were only partially trained. Thus it was no small decision to commit these divisions to combat and possible destruction. Chiang will be faced with a decision whether or not to back up his brave words with these vital military assets soon.

However, that is for another day. In the meantime read the story of German-Chinese relations leading up to the German military training mission to China here . It includes the story of the origins of Tsingtao beer. (“Rising Sun” beer during the Japanese occupation.) The Chinese owed their beer to the Germans (as well as their well trained divisions). Incidentally, it is said that Tsingtao beer does not age/travel well and tastes much better if you can get it in China where it is more likely to be fresh from the brewery. I have had the good fortune to have some personal experience on this point. I think it’s true but I’ll still drink it here from time to time.

The World War II Game

When I was a student and therefore had the time, my friends and I played board wargames. We also designed our own and I designed a World War II game. If you don’t know what I am talking about you can go here for this Wikipedia article or here for this bit of SPI nostalgia . These links will give you the idea.

Anyway, somewhere between two and five of us would be gathered around maps manipulating hundreds of cardboard pieces for hours on end. When we graduated and got serious jobs we speculated that after many years, when we were able to retire, maybe we could return to the days of having time to play again. Events have made it clear that, for a variety of reasons, this will not happen. However, my research has continued, scholarship has improved and computer games have come along. So part of this blog will be about the game – what it would look like, the supporting data, doctrine, terrain, weapons, technology, politics and the like.

I don’t know what will come of it but the thought experiment is intriguing. The last game system I used, back in 1970 something, (I used it to run through the battle of El Alamein on a notepad at a staff meeting today, did the 1940 invasion of France a few days ago.) would lend itself very nicely to a slightly modified Civilization II or III format. Maybe there will be a way to make that happen at some point.