The Polish Campaign: Results and German Lessons Learned

Germany conquered its half of Poland in 36 days. It took almost 700,000 prisoners and inflicted over 100,000 casualties in killed, wounded and missing on the Poles. The vast quantity of captured military equipment and ammunition(e.g. over 3000 artillery pieces and 16,500 machine guns), while not suitable for use by the Wehrmacht, could be used to help equip Germany’s minor allies later in the war. By contrast German personnel losses were relatively light – a total of 40,000 including 8,000 dead. Among the 22.5 million Poles in the German occupied territory were 750,000 ethnic Germans and some ethnic minorities prepared to work against the Soviet Union e.g. Ukrainians. However, the overwhelming bulk of the population was hostile and would require an occupation force.

German equipment losses were serious and illustrated the enormous strain of building and maintaining the equipment necessary for mechanized warfare. The Germans lost over 200 tanks and over 400 aircraft. More extensive still were the deferred maintenance issues and outright mechanical breakdowns associated with the demands of combat, poor roads and maintenance and repair resources that lagged far behind the rapid advance of the mechanized ground forces and aircraft operating off of improvised airfields near the front. Many German units were virtually immobile by the end of the campaign.These issues would increase with longer campaigns and tougher opposition.

As was their custom, the Germans reviewed their operations for possible improvements with an intelligent and critical eye worthy of a better cause. They certainly had reason to be satisfied. Their armored forces had overcome earlier operational issues under combat conditions and restored the war of movement the Germans had always preferred to fight, removing the threat of world war I style trench deadlock. German artillery was highly effective. The Luftwaffe had gained air superiority and successfully attacked Polish strong points, troop movements and supply columns on a large scale.

On a more detailed level however the Germans found room for improvement. Tank and motorized units were employed conservatively and cautiously by later standards. Advocates of more aggressive armored tactics were able to build on lessons learned in Poland for later campaigns including France and Russia. The lighter German tanks were found to be useful only for reconnaissance if at all. In the future production of the heavier types would be emphasized even at the expense of the total number of tanks in a division. The mg 34 machine gun was found to be vulnerable to jamming under eastern European conditions. Research was accelerated resulting in the faster development of the more reliable and faster firing mg 42.

The Germans found that their light divisions were, well, too light for sustained combat operations. They were upgraded to Panzer divisions. On the other end of the spectrum, the motorized divisions were too hard to maneuver and control with three motorized infantry regiments. They were each reduced by one such regiment.

There were additional small improvements in battlefield communications and infantry equipment. The Germans also took note of the effective use by the Poles of night attacks and guerrilla activity in rear areas. They stressed night attacks and the combat capabilities of supply column personnel in improved training methods. One area where they learned little was camouflage discipline against air attack. That would come later as the Germans faced increasingly effective air opposition.

Much of the information from this essay is drawn from “The German Campaign in Poland (1939)” the book length Department of the Army Pamphlet No. 20-255 by Robert M. Kennedy which despite being published in 1956 remains a valuable source on the campaign and is packed with the kind of detail on numbers, organization, equipment and order of battle that gladdens a war game designer’s heart.

You can read it online here .

The Polish Army of 1939

With organized Polish resistance drawing to a close, let’s take a moment to reflect on an army that had just suffered a crushing defeat. Someone, I forget who, observed that defeated armies do not get the respect they deserve. The Union army at Chancellorsville or the Austrian army at Austerlitz are undeserving of the gratuitous contempt that is directed at them by partisans of a cause or those who vicariously identify with “winners”. So it is with the Polish army of 1939.

Poland was considered a serious regional power before the war. The active army was 280,000 men organized into 30 infantry divisions (two of them mountain infantry) 11 cavalry brigades and a mechanized cavalry brigade plus corps and army level troops mostly artillery, tank, engineer, antiaircraft and signals units. There were 1,500,000 trained reservists between the ages of 24-42 plus older reservists and national guardsmen for support duties.

A look behind that organization revealed many weaknesses. There were too many men in the reserves given the Polish geography which meant there would be little time and space in which to mobilize. Much of the heavy weaponry from machine guns to artillery pieces was in short supply and obsolescent. Most notably a Polish artillery regiment contained only three artillery battalions typically two of 75 mm guns and one of 100mm howitzers. Many divisions lacked one of those battalions or the battalions themselves had two batteries instead of three. Fire control equipment was obsolescent and all artillery was foreign made. A program to upgrade to 105mm and 155mm howitzers of Polish manufacture was just beginning. By comparison the German artillery regiment in a first line infantry division was composed of three battalions of 105mm howitzers and one of 150mm howitzers with modern fire control equipment which allowed for state of the art massing and switching of fires to support planned actions while being responsive to surprise developments, and improvisations to exploit opportunities.

Polish tanks were too few, too lightly armored and deployed in separate battalions for infantry support in the manner of World War I or with the mechanized cavalry for reconnaissance. There were just too few antitank and antiaircraft guns and the quantity and quality of mortars, machine guns and light artillery for direct support of the infantry fell well short of German levels. While images of Polish cavalry attacking German tanks with lances may have been the product of German propaganda films, the fact remained that cavalry had no business on a battlefield dominated by the tank, the airplane, rapid fire artillery and the machine gun and the Polish army had 11 brigades of it. As was also the case with many other countries, Polish military doctrine had not kept up with conceptual, material and technological developments since World War I.

The things the Polish army did not lack were bravery, patriotism and a stubborn spirit of resistance. The Polish army held out as long as it could, counterattacked where it could and when possible escaped to fight another day. As this blog continues to track developments it will become clear that Polish resistance in 1939 ranks among the best of the efforts to resist German attacks under desperate circumstances in the early years of the war. Another thing to watch will be how Polish forces, many composed in substantial part of troops who escaped in 1939 and after will appear in most of the campaigns against Germany. For example, less than a year after the defeat of 1939 a Polish brigade (and a Polish submarine) will be found defending Norway against German invasion.

This spirit of resistance helps explain how a country that had already survived three partitions by major European powers went on to survive a fourth at the hands of the Germans and Russians in 1939.

The European Balance of Power 1938-1939

In American political rhetoric, the two great “lessons” of world war II are Munich and Pearl Harbor. Pearl Harbor is of course about vigilance and guarding against surprise and treachery. Munich is about standing up to “aggression”, bullies really, and as such may be the more visceral lesson of the two. Popular wisdom has it that if you stand up to bullies they are exposed as cowards and weaklings whereas if you give in they are emboldened and become more aggressive. This particular morality play aside, should Britain and France have stood up to Hitler in 1938? The stakes among nations in a situation such as Munich are very high and governments have always made some kind of effort to, ostensibly at least, substitute rational analysis for folk wisdom and emotion when making such high stakes decisions.

In offering an answer to this question, I will begin by setting some parameters based on what we know of the history. In considering the problem yourself you are free to accept or reject these parameters and adjust your own answer accordingly. First I assume Poland would not be drawn into any conflict; they were quite passive during the actual events. Second, the Soviet Union would stay out of it because lacking a common border with Czechoslovakia they would have had to pass troops through Poland. Poland would not have allowed this and the Soviets were not willing to go to war with both Poland and Germany. For an alternative theory on the Soviets read on till near the end. Third, Italy would have stayed out, just as they did when Hitler invaded Poland in 1939 and for the same reason – they considered themselves (quite justifiably) not ready for war with major European powers at the time. Accordingly, any resulting war is between Germany on the one hand and Britain, France and Czechoslovakia on the other.

Germany at the time had three operational panzer (armored) divisions each with over 500 tanks. On the other hand they had only a scattering of tanks bigger than the Panzer II with its 20 mm gun. The Czechs had a superior tank (the T-38) but in smaller quantities (four battalions assigned one each to four mixed cavalry/motorized divisions). The Czech frontier was heavily fortified but the Czechs had little time to extend the fortifications to cover the new common border with Germany created by the Anschluss. All major sources agree that Czechoslovakia would have fallen to the Germans in six weeks or less. The Germans would have had numerical superiority in infantry, artillery and armor. They would have had air superiority. They also would have had superior (albeit far from perfected) doctrine which would have made the most of both their numerical superiority and their superior capacity for mobile combined arms operations.

What then, of Britain and France? Britain, which in 1940 could only muster a little more than ten divisions on the continent of Europe would have had only two in 1938 and as such was a non-factor on the ground in the short run. France did little in 1939 to try and take pressure off the Poles through offensive action. There was no reason to expect them to be more aggressive in 1938. Even though German forces guarding the German western front would have been substantially weaker in 1938, this would not have energized the French committed as they were comitted to a defensive doctrine and enmeshed in a pessimistic strategic outlook.

Still, when Germany faced west it would have faced a situation in many ways worse than it faced in 1940. Germany’s rearmament program would have been inadequate to both sustain the offensive against Czechoslovakia and adequately arm the mobilizing German reserve forces that would provide the bulk of the infantry masses necessary to successfully attack the French in the west. Moreover while Germany had 10 panzer divisions in 1940 with operational quantities of Panzer III’s and the still heavier Panzer IV, they would have had only 3-6 panzer divisions in 1938. (Germany was adding panzer divisions constantly during this time albeit in some cases by reducing the number of tanks per division and cannibalizing motorized infantry divisions for their men and equipment -especially trucks.)   Thus it is possible or even likely that Germany, even with local air superiority, would have lacked the critical mass to wage successful “blitzkrieg” against the French. If so, the Allies were clearly mistaken not to have defied Hitler in 1938 even if such defiance meant war which it certainly would have.

So what were the allies thinking? First, their rearmament programs were just hitting full stride. Any analysis was haunted by a long list of unfilled ‘requirements’ which needed more time to be satisfied. Second, neither the British or the French had significant numbers of modern monoplane fighters while the Germans already had the Me-109. Finally allied analyses showed a more favorable ratio of forces in the future. (The critical mass of modern forces issue, i.e. quality vs. quantity, was largely lost on them.) By contrast, Hitler’s questions to his generals began with the assumption that the allies would eventually  outstrip the Germans. Accordingly, Hitler wanted to know the optimum time before the outstripping began. Framing the question from this German perspective tended to favor the conclusion that the war should begin now. This was one of the reasons Hitler was frustrated when the allies backed down in 1938 and why Hitler moved quickly against the rest of Czechoslovakia.

On the issue of the modern fighters, it appears that there was a critical mass issue there as well. Assuming German air superiority it is by no means certain that this tactical advantage would have had a decisive on  ground operations. Consider how the effect of air power was diminished in the context of the lower ratio of air to ground forces that was prevalent on the Russian front as the war ground on there particularly during the 1942-43 period. Even less so was the Luftwaffe likely, despite pre-war claims by the advocates of strategic bombing, to be decisive against Britain so long as France held out either indefinitely or long enough for the British Hurricane and Spitfire fighters to come on line. Even in 1940 German bomber forces lacked the weight of bombs to function as a war winning strategic air force.

Thus my verdict is that the allies were better off starting things in 1938. Time would favor the allies and the German capacity to disrupt that march of time would have been much reduced. There remains the question of the willingness of the French and British people to go to war. There is no doubt that both peoples yearned for peace and dreaded war. The impact of world war I was exacerbated by the economic and social effects of the Great Depression. Still, every indicator of public opinion that we have for the time shows repeatedly that a slim but persistent majority of citizens understood the need to resist Fascism and supported war if necessary to do so. Making the case for necessity was a demanding but far from impossible task of political leadership. Sometimes the rational quantitative analysis takes you only so far and the fate of nations must be entrusted to events and the aptly named fortunes of war.

Finally that last word on the Soviets. There is a school of thought that argues that the Soviets wanted to intervene against Germany. It is argued that they mobilized substantial forces and had even arranged for passage of forces through Romania into Czechoslovakia. Reading Stalin’s intent as well as Romania’s and Czechoslovakia’s comfort level with Soviet troops on their territory is a very speculative game. Suffice it to say that If the Soviets were willing to intervene, this would have further increased the balance of forces against Germany. Moreover, it is clear that Stalin’s attitude toward the western allies changed from a desire for a realpolitik based alliance to distrust and contempt as a result of Munich. The result was the Nazi-Soviet pact which will be covered here at the appropriate time.

If you want to delve deeper into my assumptions and conclusions I recommend you consult the following books. On the general history of the period and the case for war in 1938 see “The Change in the European Balance of Power 1938-1939: The Path to Ruin” by Williamson Murray. On the case for waiting for the numbers to change in the allies favor see the relevant chapter in “Dirty Little Secrets of World War II” by James Dunnigan and Albert Nofi. On the case for waiting for the modern fighters see the relevant chapter in “Fighter Tactics and Strategy 1914-1970″ by Edward H. Sims. Finally, for an assessment of British and French politics and public opinion see “The Dark Valley: a Panorama of the 1930s” by Piers Brendon

The Condor Legion

The Condor Legion was Nazi Germany’s most notable contribution to Francisco Franco’s Nationalist cause in the Spanish Civil War of 1936-1939. Hitler also contributed weapons, natural resources etc. but the Condor Legion was the only significant military unit sent to Spain by Germany.

I was in high school when I first heard the term “Condor Legion”. It immediately conjured in my mind visions of a large, fierce and formidable air force. It was only later that I learned that a Condor is a vulture, albeit a distinctively large and spectacular  one.

And so it was with the Condor Legion. You might think of it as a decisive force in a campaign to promote fascist ascendancy and solidarity throughout Europe. Not quite. Hermann Goering testified at Nuremberg that Hitler was at first reluctant to commit significant forces to Spain but when Goering pointed out the learning opportunities the Fuehrer brightened at the prospect.

It has also been argued that Hitler was careful to make sure his intervention, quantitatively much less than was provided by Mussolini’s Italy, didn’t end the war too fast i.e. before Italy’s role in aiding Franco thoroughly destroyed any remaining good relations Italy had with Britain and France.

The first German intervention was a small unit of Junkers Ju-52 transport planes which were used to ferry troops and supplies of the Spanish Army of Africa across the Straits of Gibraltar to Spain past the Spanish navy which had by and large remained loyal to the government and was blocking transfer by sea. The Army of Africa was an elite force which possessed most of the recent combat experience in the Spanish army putting down rebellions both major and minor in Spain’s African possessions. It included Moroccans who fought fiercely for the  Nationalists.  (Although they had never flown  before and  suffered extensively from air sickness, the Germans had to post guards to prevent the Moroccans from sneaking onto and overloading the transport planes.) It also included the (at this time almost entirely Spanish and all volunteer) Spanish Foreign Legion whose motto was “Long Live Death” – Francisco Franco was the Legion’s first Deputy Commander at its founding in 1920. These troops were decisive in giving the Nationalist revolt a firm footing in 1936.

Very shortly thereafter the first German volunteers were sent to Spain posing as a tourist group of photographers, engineers and salesmen. Once in Spain this thin pretense was dropped and the volunteers were incorporated into the roles available under the Condor Legion organization which contained five major groupings.

These were (1) the bomber group – initially composed of Ju-52s which were considered suitable as bombers at the time; (2) the transport group – Ju52s in their air transport role ; (3) the fighter group  – Heinkel He51s a fighter design that was considered obsolete well before 1939;  (4) The flak group for antiaircraft defense and (5) a small ground force for airfield security. In keeping with the small German presence the Spanish provided some personnel. For example, the flak personnel were Spanish commanded by Spanish officers under overall German supervision. Aircraft maintenance was provided by Lufthansa civilians already working in Spain.

I won’t do a campaign history here. There are books for that. A good source is a book that I relied on heavily for this mini-essay i.e. Peter Elstob’s “Condor Legion” which is weapons book no. 35 in the Ballantine’s Illustrated History of the Violent Century series.

So what did the German’s learn at Spanish expense and for a relatively small fee in blood and treasure as these things go? First, they needed better planes. After the first encounters with Russia’s agile biplane fighter the Polikarpov I-15 out went the He-51s and the Ju-52’s were consigned exclusively to the transport role. The new German fighter was the very successful Messerschmidt Me-109B (later also the C and E series) and the bombing was taken over by He-111’s and Dornier Do -17’s.

The Germans practiced dive bombing, first with the Henschel Hs 123A and later with their world war II mainstay the Ju-87 Stuka. They practiced aerial bombing of cities, most infamously, thanks to Pablo Picasso, Guernica. More practically and frequently they bombed Madrid and other fiercely defended Spanish towns and cities. It was in Spain that they practiced the sequence of a first wave of attack with 2000 pound bombs aimed at the largest buildings, a second wave with 500 pound bombs to break up the rubble and smaller buildings and make them burn more readily, a third wave with incendiaries and, after an interval to let people come out to fight the fires, a fourth wave armed with anti-personnel fragmentation bombs.

Shortly after the initial formation of the Condor Legion, the Germans added a small but high tech ground force composed of tanks, machine gun units and flak in a ground role. This allowed the Germans to practice the employment of tanks, close air support techniques and the use of flak as an anti-tank weapon. (It always stuns me to recall that the first German General Staff paper on the anti-tank potential of the 88mm anti-aircraft gun was written in 1919.) The Germans also operated in cooperation with Spanish infantry and artillery.

Despite my snarky comments at the beginning of this essay (vultures etc.) the Condor Legion was helpful to the Nationalists all out of proportion to its small numbers. Once the Germans grasped the value of Spain as a learning laboratory for Blitzkrieg, the volunteer system was scrapped and Germany’s most promising military personnel, officers, pilots and others, were assigned to and rotated through the Condor Legion to hone their skills

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army

The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is at this time in history a low profile yet ultimately very important member of th cast of characters in this particular historical drama. I didn’t mention it in the chronology because it wasn’t an event that rose to that level but the PLA has already made itself felt on the battlefield.

On September 25, 1937 their 115th division ambushed the Japanese 5th division as it was advancing after the fall of Peking. The Japanese were advancing carelessly, strung out along the line of march with little or no reconnaissance. The ambush was a success and the Japanese suffered almost 5,000 casualties and the loss of weapons, equipment and supplies. Chinese losses are not reliably known but were undoubtedly much less.

This was not a big victory in the conventional sense. It had a negligible impact on the course of operations. The PLA never did this again in the war against the Japanese. Indeed the next time they operated on a divisional scale was against Chiang’s nationalist forces. Still, it had the symbolic effect of establishing a PLA presence and providing a tangible contribution to the united front against Japan. The PLA and the Chinese Communist movement lived off the propaganda fruits of this victory for a long time.

The PLA made a virtue of necessity and emphasized intangibles in areas such as morale, indoctrination, political warfare, sound tactical and strategic doctrine and superior preparation, local knowledge and recconnaisance. Marine colonel Evans Carlson, later of Carlson’s Raiders fame, was the first foreign military observer to reach the Communist areas. He was impressed with the high morale and physical endurance of the PLA forces. At one point he noted a march, by a 600 man battalion, of 58 miles in 32 hours – in mountainous terrain – much of it at night.

Mao Tse Tung argued that the good fighting qualities of the PLA were based on three things: good relations between the troops and their officers, good relations between the army and the people, and wearing down the enemy with aggressive treatment of enemy resistance and lenient treatment of those who surrendered – all combined with a steady drumbeat of political education and propaganda. Such was the state of things in China at the time that the first two of these represented powerful innovations. The last was an effort in sowing seeds that would ultimately fall on fertile ground.

At this time the PLA amounted to the Eighth Route Army of 3 divisions totaling 45,000 men. They had another 45,000 organized into smaller guerrilla style units. This was the start of something big.

 

The Nationalist Chinese Air Force

There is a book waiting to be written – perhaps it has been but I haven’t seen it- on the Nationalist Chinese Air Force in World War II. The story of the official Chinese Air Force begins with an American training mission in 1932.  The American mission ends in December 1934 when the contract expires. Although the Japanese apply pressure to end the American connection – rumor has it that Chiang makes a show of conciliating the Japanese while retaliating against the Americans for failing to engage in combat to help Chiang  put down an attempted coup by a warlord in Fukien province in 1934.

Whatever the real reason, the American mission is superseded by an Italian one. The Italian mission’s flying school boasts a 100%  graduation rate. Chinese pilots, it seems, never wash out under Italian tutelage. The  Italians also sell aircraft to China and establish  a badly run factory for producing Italian aircraft in China.

When war with Japan begins, the nominal Chinese air force is 500 aircraft and 350 pilots. However when you subtract the planes that are either trainers, mechanically unserviceable or existing only on paper it amounted to about 100 combat aircraft and perhaps 150 pilots able to fly them in combat.

For airplanes, the Chinese had a mix of  types including Curtis Hawk biplanes, Boeing P 26s, Vought Corsairs, (the biplane) as well as Heinkel, Breda and Fiat fighters.  For bombers they had some Junkers, Capronis and Savoia Marchetti 81s and a few Martin 139s and Northrop attack planes – a single engine light bomber type.

So the Nationalist air force began with a very mixed bag of planes for a limited supply of pilots. However, their most important air asset was acquired in a semi-fortuitous way. There was always a faction of the Nationalist leadership that regretted the departure of the Americans and wanted to bring them back. In 1936 a Chinese general traveling in America observed an American army aerobatic team led by a Captain Claire Chennault. The Chinese offered Chennault more money and – more importantly – more freedom, responsibility and authority than he could ever hope to have in the American Army Air Force to serve as adviser to the Chinese on air force matters. Before the Flying Tigers, Chennault devoted his efforts to getting the best out of China’s mixed bag of dubious air assets including new foreign aid – most notably two bomber and four fighter squadrons provided by the Soviet Union in late 1937.

When the war with Japan began, Chiang committed his air force to the battle for Shanghai where the Chinese developed a reputation for weak flying skills and great courage and devotion. Their attacks were pressed home ferociously. They even raided Japanese bomber bases on Formosa. However, their attacks achieved little except the exhaustion of the Chinese bomber force.

Chinese fighter pilots were more effective defending Chinese cities against Japanese bombing raids. Using tactics developed by Claire Chennault, the Chinese inflicted heavy losses on unescorted Japanese bombers, refuting the theory that bombers would always get through and could only be countered by even more powerful bombing attacks. Even when the Japanese changed tactics and started sending strong fighter escorts the Chinese pilots held there own.

Of course it could not last. The Chinese effort was not sustainable. What saved the Chinese from the Japanese air force was the Japanese need for more aircraft for the Pacific and Southeast Asia. The Soviets stopped helping the Chinese first because of their nonagression pact with Japan’s ally Germany. Then because they needed every plane to defend themselves against those same Germans. The Americans felt their own industrial and logistical resources were best spent establishing an American air presence in China.

Still, there is a fascinating story here. Has anyone told it? Is it available in English? If not, here is an idea for some aviation enthusiast’s book project. If someone writes it, I’ll certainly read it.

The Imperial Japanese Army

When you consider the Japanese army of 1937 the first concept that should come to mind is modernization. The Japanese army went from the technological equivalent of the 17th century in 1867 to the point of defeating the Tsarist Russian army in the Russo – Japanese war of 1904-1905 . It was the Russians under a backward imperial regime and the Russians were at the end of a long Siberian supply line but it was still a monumental achievement.

This voluntary act of wrenching modernization was still under way in 1937 but the Japanese army was falling behind Japan’s Navy and its Air Force in the modernization race. Still, they were more than a match for the Chinese in a stand up fight and this was both a blessing and a curse since being more than a match for the Chinese did not prepare them for the Russians in 1938 and 1939. Even less were they ready for the Americans in 1941-45, a reformed British army in 1944-45, and a Russian army fresh off its victory over the Germans in 1945.

The Japanese army of the 1930’s was no more than in the middle of the pack of major powers. Their strength was in their infantry which possessed a martial spirit, a capacity for enduring physical hardship and a 99% basic literacy rate. This last meant that both instruction and indoctrination could be in writing.

Japanese soldiers were told that war was the highest expression of culture and civilization. They were also told “Fight hard. If you are afraid of dying you will die in battle; if you are not afraid, you will not die.” This was an all too simplistic version of the advice to the Samurai of the pregunpowder era that your best chance of survival was to suppress your fear of death which could only hinder you and concentrate on fighting technique to insure victory and survival. Finally they were instructed “Under no circumstances become a straggler or a prisoner of war. In case you become helpless, commit suicide nobly.”

The Japanese army was always a little short in the quality of its equipment. Bolt action rifles, machine guns that fired more slowly, smaller amounts of artillery, lighter caliber artillery; these were the consistent patterns compared with the better European armies. One area where they did excel was mortars and light field guns for direct fire support. This helped them a lot in their battles in Southeast Asia in 1941-42.

Two areas where they fell short in absolute terms were armor and antiaircraft artillery. In armor they were perhaps on a par or even slightly behind the Italians. They formed their first tank company in 1931, their first tank brigade in 1934 and a total of four armored divisions during the war. Even the Italians formed five armored divisions and more regularly employed their armored and motorized troops in concentrated groups.

With rare exceptions the Japanese employed their tanks in small groups in direct support of their infantry. They had very limited quantities of antiaircraft artillery. Conditions in China provided no incentive for improving either of these circumstances.

In terms of numbers the Japanese army in July of 1937 numbered 462, 000. This translated into 17 divisions in China plus units in Japan and Korea. The Japanese also possessed 1.5 million fully trained reserves and an additional 2.5 million partially trained. These were rapidly called upon as the war in China expanded. By the time of Pearl Harbor the Japanese had 35 of 51 divisions in China as well as 38 of 39 independent brigades.

The relatively small number of Japanese troops initially in China is made even more clear when you consider that the Japanese army viewed the Soviet Union as a major threat and kept the elite units of its Kwantung army ready to fight the Soviets if necessary. Japanese reservists did the larger share of the fighting in the North China campaigns and gained experience for future battles. This fact also supports the case that the Japanese did not possess a master plan for conquest at the start of the war with China. Rather they allowed themselves to be drawn in by a series of incremental decisions and non-decisions. This is not a good way to run a war or conduct a foreign policy as subsequent events were to show.

Chiang’s German Trained Divisions

In 1937 the hard core of the Nationalist Chinese Army was the group of German trained Divisions. The typical Nationalist Chinese Division of the day was a motley group of 4,000 – 6,000 men indifferently armed and indifferently trained. They were not necessarily directly loyal to Chiang Kai-shek but instead answered to a “warlord” political ally of Chiang who might be of doubtful loyalty in the long run.

The German trained divisions on the other hand were under Chiang’s direct command, full strength and got the best equipment. The official organization of a Nationalist Chinese Division was 10,923 men organized into three infantry regiments, an artillery regiment and various supporting units e.g engineer and quartermaster battalions. The total of heavy weapons would include 328 machine guns and 46 artillery pieces. The German trained divisions actually approximated these numbers. Other divisions had less.

This did not mean the other forces were worthless. The Nationalist Chinese 29th “army” several divisions of the understrength variety is on this day 70 years ago defending Peking and environs. It has a proud history of fighting the Japanese in the various “incidents” since 1931. It’s high morale and anti-Japanese spirit is contributing to the breakdown of cease fires and negotiations that is going on. Unfortunately it has three disadvantages. First, it is understrength and under-equipped. It is probably a match for one Japanese Division if it is in defense of a strong position. Second, its position is not strong. It is scattered and unwilling to make Peking a fortress even if it had the time and resources. Third, Chiang does not trust its leader and therefore it cannot expect much help from Chiang.

What about the typical Japanese Division? In 1937 it is a very strong formation – over 20,000 men, 645 machine guns, 108 artillery pieces and a strong set of supporting units including substantial motorized transport (to supplement the over 5, 800 horses) and as many as 24 light tanks. Good training and strong logistical support mean the Japanese are able to take the offensive in a sustained way that the Chinese have a hard time matching when they can do it at all.

Chiang’s German trained hard core is typically reported as “30 divisions totaling 300,000 men”. If only. In fact 8 divisions including the Training Division were fully trained. “Training Division” should probably be rendered as “Demonstration” Division after the fashion of the German “Panzer Lehr” division and “Infantry Lehr” regiment which were composed of troops which normally served to train others but which could be committed as a combat unit if necessary. The rest of these comparatively elite divisions which in fact may have only numbered 12 were only partially trained. Thus it was no small decision to commit these divisions to combat and possible destruction. Chiang will be faced with a decision whether or not to back up his brave words with these vital military assets soon.

However, that is for another day. In the meantime read the story of German-Chinese relations leading up to the German military training mission to China here . It includes the story of the origins of Tsingtao beer. (“Rising Sun” beer during the Japanese occupation.) The Chinese owed their beer to the Germans (as well as their well trained divisions). Incidentally, it is said that Tsingtao beer does not age/travel well and tastes much better if you can get it in China where it is more likely to be fresh from the brewery. I have had the good fortune to have some personal experience on this point. I think it’s true but I’ll still drink it here from time to time.

The Nationalist Chinese Army

The Nationalist Chinese Army does not have a good reputation here in America. Perhaps that is because it so completely failed to serve American expectations. Americans expected it to (1) actively take the war to the Japanese by waging war agressively against them and (2) defeat Mao tse Tung’s Communist forces after the war. Ah well, another big batch of American military aid that failed to achieve its objectives.

The Nationalist Chinese Army’s assigned objectives from (ahem) its own government were (1) preserve the nation and its honor by resisting Japanese conquest (2) conserve its strength for the coming civil war with the Communists and (3) win that civil war. It achieved the first two. The third is beyond the scope of this blog.

The army’s major strengths were (1) foreign aid including weapons from a variety of countries and German training – especially for a relatively elite group of 30 divisions in 1937 and a similar group armed and trained by the Americans after 1941 (2) the capacity to produce a material quantity of its own weapons from rifles and machine guns to mortars and field artillery along with the associated ammunition (3) a will to resist based on nationalism and a habit of obedience among the rank and file and (4) the proverbial “inexhaustible” supply of manpower.

I have to note here that this last advantage, much beloved of military historians, comes at a tremendous human cost. Take hundreds of millions of people. Keep them in poverty and ignorance, generally treat them like dirt and start watching them die from the day they are born. Then set in motion the war machinery that actively kills them. Enjoy the military advantages of “an inexhaustible supply of sturdy peasants accustomed to privation.” See the results and pay the price after the war. Makes Mao tse Tung look good by comparison – at least for a while. (Two song lyrics come to mind; “grasp and reach for a leg of hope” (Violent Femmes – “Add It Up”) and “Meet the new boss, same as the old boss.” (The Who – Won’t Get Fooled Again). World history and political science in convenient rock lyric form.

But I digress. The army’s weaknesses were (1) No modern weapons capability i.e. couldn’t make them, couldn’t buy them, couldn’t use or support them. (2) Weak logistics i.e. very little in the way of equipment, supplies or transport. Sustained offensive operations were out of the question. (3) At best uneven institutional strengths i.e. uninspired doctrine, substantial corruption, lack of unity and discipline among the top leadership.

What were the results? The Nationalists fought when they had to and did what they needed to do by their own lights. The best estimate I have seen is that they inflicted over 388,000 deaths on the Japanese. In China, where the Japanese typically did not have to fight to the death and commit suicide to avoid capture, it is reasonable to estimate that the number of Japanese wounded was much larger. it is not unreasonable to estimate that the Japanese total casualties in China reached one million killed, wounded, missing and prisoners. By the time of America’s entry into the war the Japanese had already been convinced that outright conquest of China was, at the least, not practical.

Correspondingly, Chinese casualties were in the millions. The Nationalist army numbered 2.5 million at the start of the war, reached a peak strength of 5.7 million and had 5 million under arms at the time of Japan’s surrender. A total of 14 million men served during the war. Even allowing for the doubtless substantial desertion rate, discharges due to health and age  and the poor record keeping, the math speaks for itself. It was never said of the Nationalist Chinese, as it was of the Italians by their German allies, that their casualties were light because they had run away so fast.

For details on organization and equipment plus some great photographs and a concise account of military operations from 1937-1941 I recommend the book Prelude to Pearl Harbor by Roy M. Stanley . A copy for purchase can be found via Bookfinder or try your local library.