The Last Week of Peace in Europe

Seventy years ago today marks the last of the final seven days of peace in Europe. Readers of this blog know that Japan and China had been fighting for more than two years and that Japan and Russia were concluding another round of serious fighting. Now however the fighting is about to spread further.

In the final seven days mobilization and deployments have begun. Germany is ready with its army and air force fully mobilized and deployed. German submarines have taken up stations in the Atlantic and the Baltic. Other countries are in various states of readiness. Most notably, Poland has waited until August 30th to begin mobilization thus assuring that many of its reservists will still be en route to their assigned depots when the Germans attack. In one of a series of decisions in which there are few if any good options for the Poles they have decided that their first priority is to ensure that they are seen as the victim of German aggression. This will ensure the maximum sympathy of Britain and France. British and French intervention and effective assistance is Poland’s only long term strategic hope and so mobilization occurs at the eleventh hour.

There is really no need for further discussion or calculation as both sides are set for war. Hitler wants Poland and also wants war now. The comparative advantage he has achieved by beginning rearmament in 1933 is threatening to be eroded by the belated but growing rearmament efforts of Britain and France. For him, the worst thing that could happen is concession or conciliation efforts.

He need not worry. Poland will fight. With the example of a freshly dismembered Czechoslovakia in front of them they feel they have nothing to lose by resistance. Britain and France are also determined there will be no more concessions to Germany and they have begun their own mobilizations.

Nonetheless a final round of discussions does take place. On August 25th Britain and Poland sign a treaty of mutual assistance, any concerns that the Russians may have about such an agreement having been swept aside by their own treaty with Germany. On the same day Italy informs Germany that it will not support Germany in the coming war unless it receives an impossible level of weapons and resource assistance from Germany. The German attack, originally scheduled for August 26th, is postponed to September 1st.

Hitler uses the lull to satisfy himself that the Italian demands cannot be met, and that he does not need Italy for his coming operations. This does not take long so he also makes one more attempt to split off the British from the Poles. This effort produces nothing except for an absurd incident where the British and German ambassadors almost come to blows on the night of August 30/31 when the German ambassador refuses to provide a list of Germany’s demands on Poland.

Thus does war begin anew in Europe and tomorrow will be the day.

The Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact

On August 23rd 1939, Germany and the Soviet Union signed a 10 year non-aggression treaty in which they agreed not to attack each other and to resolve disputes by peaceful means. In a secret protocol they agreed to divide up Poland and Germany further agreed to give the Soviets a free hand regarding the Baltic States of Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia. Four days before on August 19th a trade agreement had been signed and nine days later World War II in Europe began.

The immediate results of this agreement was that Hitler was able to wage war against the western allies, which was by now a clearly foreseeable consequence of his planned invasion of Poland, without a threat of Soviet intervention and with access via trade to Soviet raw materials and food. Stalin got more buffer territory against invasion which, to his puzzling surprise, he would need before the ten years was up.

An excellent collection of documents on Nazi-Soviet relations during this period can be found here . It includes the text of the secret protocol, the existence of which the Soviets denied until 1989. A better example of the cynical euphemisms of the bureaucratic writing style would be hard to find.

Nomonhan/Khalkhin Gol

On August 20th, 1939, the Soviets launched their biggest attack to date in the continuing “Nomonhan Incident” known to the Soviets as the battle of Khalkhin Gol. Earlier I described how the Japanese offensive of July 23rd had been defeated by massed Soviet artillery fire. This time the Soviets added tanks to the mix.

The offensive, which struck just four days before a planned attack by the Japanese, was commanded by then Lieutenant General Georgy Zhukov about whom we will hear much more in the future. Stalin was determined to resolve this front, having other matters to attend to as we shall soon see, and so Zhukov brought with him heavy reinforcements of armored and motorized forces. In all he deployed three infantry divisions, two motorized divisions, two tank divisions and two independent tank brigades all supported by over 250 aircraft.

With the three infantry divisions and a tank brigade he attacked and pinned the Japanese center. With the armored and motorized forces he then turned both Japanese flanks. The result was the encirclement and destruction of the Japanese 23rd infantry division. Japanese relief attempts failed and by August 31st it was all over. Japanese losses exceeded 70% of the forces engaged.

The Japanese were once again overmatched. While they had occasionally demonstrated a marginal superiority in quality over Soviet infantry, when that infantry was supported by tanks and artillery under a commander that understood and applied combined arms doctrine,  along with the principles of mass and mobility the result was a decisive Japanese defeat. To their credit, the Japanese ground forces never lost cohesion even in the face of their horrific casualties – casualties that would have broken a lesser force. They inflicted approximately 25,000 casualties on the Soviets while likely suffering close to double that number themselves. Nonetheless, the Japanese were fortunate that the Soviets chose not to press their advantage any further.

This battle pretty much ensured that future Japanese offensives would be directed at China and the Pacific rather than at Soviet Russia. The Japanese would not rethink their ground warfare doctrine. Realistically, they could not do so since they did not have the industrial strength to have a world class navy and air force and also have an army equipped on a German or Soviet scale.

It is interesting to me that this Soviet offensive was conducted by the same army that was seen as ineffective in the Russo – Finnish War and as having its leadership decimated by Stalin’s 1937 – 1938 purges. Moreover, it is generally thought to have lost most of its ability to conduct mobile warfare as the leading mobile warfare proponents fell victim to the purge and more conservative leadership reasserted itself. Soviet success at Khalkhin Gol may be attributed to the fact that Zhukov understood mobile warfare, survived the purges and had a leadership style that got his orders zealously followed through inspiration and , failing that, raw fear. You could sometimes fail to attain your objective, but only if you were seen to have tried very hard and the measure of your trying was your persistence and your casualty rate. As a Zhukov subordinate your career and indeed your life were at risk if you were seen to falter in pursuit of your objective.

There are a number of general accounts of the battle but a particularly revealing account, using a focus on some Japanese units is found here.