The European Balance of Power 1938-1939

In American political rhetoric, the two great “lessons” of world war II are Munich and Pearl Harbor. Pearl Harbor is of course about vigilance and guarding against surprise and treachery. Munich is about standing up to “aggression”, bullies really, and as such may be the more visceral lesson of the two. Popular wisdom has it that if you stand up to bullies they are exposed as cowards and weaklings whereas if you give in they are emboldened and become more aggressive. This particular morality play aside, should Britain and France have stood up to Hitler in 1938? The stakes among nations in a situation such as Munich are very high and governments have always made some kind of effort to, ostensibly at least, substitute rational analysis for folk wisdom and emotion when making such high stakes decisions.

In offering an answer to this question, I will begin by setting some parameters based on what we know of the history. In considering the problem yourself you are free to accept or reject these parameters and adjust your own answer accordingly. First I assume Poland would not be drawn into any conflict; they were quite passive during the actual events. Second, the Soviet Union would stay out of it because lacking a common border with Czechoslovakia they would have had to pass troops through Poland. Poland would not have allowed this and the Soviets were not willing to go to war with both Poland and Germany. For an alternative theory on the Soviets read on till near the end. Third, Italy would have stayed out, just as they did when Hitler invaded Poland in 1939 and for the same reason – they considered themselves (quite justifiably) not ready for war with major European powers at the time. Accordingly, any resulting war is between Germany on the one hand and Britain, France and Czechoslovakia on the other.

Germany at the time had three operational panzer (armored) divisions each with over 500 tanks. On the other hand they had only a scattering of tanks bigger than the Panzer II with its 20 mm gun. The Czechs had a superior tank (the T-38) but in smaller quantities (four battalions assigned one each to four mixed cavalry/motorized divisions). The Czech frontier was heavily fortified but the Czechs had little time to extend the fortifications to cover the new common border with Germany created by the Anschluss. All major sources agree that Czechoslovakia would have fallen to the Germans in six weeks or less. The Germans would have had numerical superiority in infantry, artillery and armor. They would have had air superiority. They also would have had superior (albeit far from perfected) doctrine which would have made the most of both their numerical superiority and their superior capacity for mobile combined arms operations.

What then, of Britain and France? Britain, which in 1940 could only muster a little more than ten divisions on the continent of Europe would have had only two in 1938 and as such was a non-factor on the ground in the short run. France did little in 1939 to try and take pressure off the Poles through offensive action. There was no reason to expect them to be more aggressive in 1938. Even though German forces guarding the German western front would have been substantially weaker in 1938, this would not have energized the French committed as they were comitted to a defensive doctrine and enmeshed in a pessimistic strategic outlook.

Still, when Germany faced west it would have faced a situation in many ways worse than it faced in 1940. Germany’s rearmament program would have been inadequate to both sustain the offensive against Czechoslovakia and adequately arm the mobilizing German reserve forces that would provide the bulk of the infantry masses necessary to successfully attack the French in the west. Moreover while Germany had 10 panzer divisions in 1940 with operational quantities of Panzer III’s and the still heavier Panzer IV, they would have had only 3-6 panzer divisions in 1938. (Germany was adding panzer divisions constantly during this time albeit in some cases by reducing the number of tanks per division and cannibalizing motorized infantry divisions for their men and equipment -especially trucks.)   Thus it is possible or even likely that Germany, even with local air superiority, would have lacked the critical mass to wage successful “blitzkrieg” against the French. If so, the Allies were clearly mistaken not to have defied Hitler in 1938 even if such defiance meant war which it certainly would have.

So what were the allies thinking? First, their rearmament programs were just hitting full stride. Any analysis was haunted by a long list of unfilled ‘requirements’ which needed more time to be satisfied. Second, neither the British or the French had significant numbers of modern monoplane fighters while the Germans already had the Me-109. Finally allied analyses showed a more favorable ratio of forces in the future. (The critical mass of modern forces issue, i.e. quality vs. quantity, was largely lost on them.) By contrast, Hitler’s questions to his generals began with the assumption that the allies would eventually  outstrip the Germans. Accordingly, Hitler wanted to know the optimum time before the outstripping began. Framing the question from this German perspective tended to favor the conclusion that the war should begin now. This was one of the reasons Hitler was frustrated when the allies backed down in 1938 and why Hitler moved quickly against the rest of Czechoslovakia.

On the issue of the modern fighters, it appears that there was a critical mass issue there as well. Assuming German air superiority it is by no means certain that this tactical advantage would have had a decisive on  ground operations. Consider how the effect of air power was diminished in the context of the lower ratio of air to ground forces that was prevalent on the Russian front as the war ground on there particularly during the 1942-43 period. Even less so was the Luftwaffe likely, despite pre-war claims by the advocates of strategic bombing, to be decisive against Britain so long as France held out either indefinitely or long enough for the British Hurricane and Spitfire fighters to come on line. Even in 1940 German bomber forces lacked the weight of bombs to function as a war winning strategic air force.

Thus my verdict is that the allies were better off starting things in 1938. Time would favor the allies and the German capacity to disrupt that march of time would have been much reduced. There remains the question of the willingness of the French and British people to go to war. There is no doubt that both peoples yearned for peace and dreaded war. The impact of world war I was exacerbated by the economic and social effects of the Great Depression. Still, every indicator of public opinion that we have for the time shows repeatedly that a slim but persistent majority of citizens understood the need to resist Fascism and supported war if necessary to do so. Making the case for necessity was a demanding but far from impossible task of political leadership. Sometimes the rational quantitative analysis takes you only so far and the fate of nations must be entrusted to events and the aptly named fortunes of war.

Finally that last word on the Soviets. There is a school of thought that argues that the Soviets wanted to intervene against Germany. It is argued that they mobilized substantial forces and had even arranged for passage of forces through Romania into Czechoslovakia. Reading Stalin’s intent as well as Romania’s and Czechoslovakia’s comfort level with Soviet troops on their territory is a very speculative game. Suffice it to say that If the Soviets were willing to intervene, this would have further increased the balance of forces against Germany. Moreover, it is clear that Stalin’s attitude toward the western allies changed from a desire for a realpolitik based alliance to distrust and contempt as a result of Munich. The result was the Nazi-Soviet pact which will be covered here at the appropriate time.

If you want to delve deeper into my assumptions and conclusions I recommend you consult the following books. On the general history of the period and the case for war in 1938 see “The Change in the European Balance of Power 1938-1939: The Path to Ruin” by Williamson Murray. On the case for waiting for the numbers to change in the allies favor see the relevant chapter in “Dirty Little Secrets of World War II” by James Dunnigan and Albert Nofi. On the case for waiting for the modern fighters see the relevant chapter in “Fighter Tactics and Strategy 1914-1970″ by Edward H. Sims. Finally, for an assessment of British and French politics and public opinion see “The Dark Valley: a Panorama of the 1930s” by Piers Brendon

China Update

The Japanese, having secured all the major cities in eastern China including the ports, must now drive west into China’s interior. They have recently captured Nanchang, a small but strategically located rail junction town on the Changsha – Shanghai rail line. It is an essential jumping off point for any attack on Changsha, the logical first major objective in a renewed Japanese offensive. Changsha bars the way to the Nationalist capital at Chunking and the bulk of China’s relocated war industries essential to China’s continued resistance.

Once again the Japanese offensive pace is sluggish and their blows are not decisive. The Chinese appear to be massing for a counter-offensive.

Britain and France Ally with Poland, Greece and Romania

Having already agreed to protect Poland’s western border against agression (March 31, 1939), Britain and France agree to protect Greece and Romania on April 13, 1939 – seventy years ago today. These commitments were in response to Hitler’s move against the rest of Czechoslovakia and Mussolini’s invasion of Albania respectively.

European Update-Spanish Civil War Ends, Italy Invades Albania

Two items which perhaps deserved their own chronological entries. Ah well, real life sometimes intervenes. On March 28, 1939, Francisco Franco’s Nationalist forces entered Madrid effectively ending the Spanish Civil War. Shortly thereafter Spain signed the anti-Comintern Pact thus aligning with Germany, Italy and Japan. Franco, having come to power with considerable military and economic aid from Germany and Italy, feels the need to stay aligned with them if only because Spain is economically and militarily weak and Franco’s power is new and unconsolidated in a world full of enemies.

Franco also feels the need to serve Spain’s nationalist agenda as well as his own. How much this departs from Hitler’s and Mussolini’s idea of Fascist solidarity and anti-communist crusade remains to be seen. While outwardly just another uniformed Fascist dictator, Franco is a real general and wears the uniform of his army, has good relations with the Catholic church and departs in a number of other ways from the agenda of Hitler’s Germany. Still, the possible entry of Spain into a future European war on the side of the axis powers will present serious problems for and call for extensive countermeasures by the western allies.

On April 7, 1939 Italy invaded Albania thus pursuing its own continued pattern of aggression in the shadow of its more powerful German ally.  After four days of ineffectual Albanian resistance, Italy completed its occupation of the country. Shortly thereafter, Albania’s King Zog having fled the country for Greece and ultimately Britain, the  now Italian controlled Albanian parliament named the King of Italy, Victor Emanuelle III, King of Albania as well.