Chinese Victory at Taierhchuang

After the Japanese cleared the Shantung Peninsula , they linked up with units which had driven south from Peking and moved further south intent on capturing Hsuchow. Another force moved out of Nanking driving toward Hsuchow from the south. The combined Japanese force amounted to eight full Japanese divisions, elements of three others and five independent brigades.

Against these the Chinese committed sixty-three of their much smaller and less heavily equipped divisions. The Japanese used their superior firepower to grind down and destroy numerous Chinese units as they advanced. Secure in their confidence in victory, the Japanese allowed a salient to develop in their lines and this was when the Chinese struck to pinch off the salient at the town of Taierhchuang. As I noted earlier, the Chinese had resolved at the beginning of the year to defend more actively as they withdrew. They had been doing so with small attacks on the flanks and an increasing guerrilla presence but on this occasion they outdid themselves.

And so on March 25, 1938 the surviving Japanese troops withdrew from the Taierhchuang salient after two weeks of intense fighting. Once again the Chinese had staked their best troops and equipment (including 100 aircraft) to make a stand. Many of their troops in this battle were drawn from the surge of patriotic volunteers, including many students, that came when full scale fighting, especially at Shanghai, erupted the previous year. This group was above average in both motivation and education compared to the average Chinese recruit.

The result of the battle was the severe mauling of two Japanese divisions. Japanese casualties were estimated to be somewhere between 16,000 to 30,000 depending on which account you want to believe. Chinese casualties were also heavy, perhaps roughly equal to those of the Japanese.

Some have described the Chinese victory as Pyrrhic since Chinese casualties were high and came disproportionately from their best and brightest young men. Others have tried to argue that this was no victory at all. However, these arguments tend to focus on the number of casualties or possession of the ground. (The Chinese possessed the field immediately after the battle but withdrew a short time later.) The strategic results of the battle are perhaps more interesting and informative. The Japanese felt compelled to commit two more divisions from Nanking to their offensive. They added three more divisions to the mission of providing security over occupied Chinese territory. The Japanese who had begun their campaign in China with 15 divisions were now committing 31 divisions and were slowly starting to draw more forces from their elite formations watching the Russians on the Manchurian border.

The Chinese used the lull in operations to withdraw further and prepare defenses deeper into China while continuing to build up their guerrilla effort. Their seems little doubt that by the more complex standards of modern twentieth century warfare the Chinese had won an important victory. The battle also had an impact on Japanese thinking, making significant inroads into the fading Japanese belief that victory in China could be achieved quickly or cheaply.

Anschluss or Meanwhile in Europe

On March 12, 1938 German troops marched into Austria to enforce Hitler’s demand for the annexation of Austria to Germany. The way was made smooth by an internal coup the previous night by the Austrian Nazi Party. The legitimate Austrian government of Austrian Chancellor Kurt Schuschnigg was by this time powerless to do anything. Schuschnigg’s last minute appeals to Britain and France for assistance came to nothing. Schushnigg was arrested and imprisoned under conditions of abuse and solitary confinement that caused him to lose 58 pounds during his first year of confinement. He survived however to the point where on May 1, 1945 a Gestapo officer showed him his name on a list of those who, on Heinrich Himmler’sorders, were to be executed before they fell into Allied hands. On May 4, 1945 he was freed by American troops before the execution orders could be carried out. He has told his own story in his book Austrian Requiem.

The German invasion became a victory parade as a combination of Nazi subversion and substantial genuine support for unification undermined any possibility of Austrian resistance. An account of the events can be found here . Perhaps a victory parade was all the Germans could handle. According to German army reports, Hitler’s fledgling Panzer forces suffered a vehicle breakdown rate of somewhere between thirty and seventy percent on their march to Vienna. Hitler’s secret police and political operatives were more practiced and efficient. During the first few weeks of occupation Himmler’s Gestapo arrested 79,000 Austrians in the Vienna area alone. Repressive secret police methods and the absence of a secret ballot meant that a referendum to ratify “unification” (perhaps more accurately annexation) on April 10th produced a 99.75% “yes” vote in Austria. Interestingly the corresponding “yes” vote in Germany was slightly less – 99.08%

Other developments in the rise of Germany under Hitler e.g. the reoccupation of the Rhineland, the restoration of the Saar after 15 years of occupation and German rearmament in violation of the original terms of the Versailles treaty happened before the time period covered by this blog. The Anschluss was significant not only for its addition of seven million people and the associated resources to Hitler’s Reich, which could not be justified as a restoration of the status quo ante, but also for its blatant violation of the Versailles treaty which prohibited German and Austrian unification. The passive response of Britain and France set the tone for the remaining time before the outbreak of war.

I will close with an excerpt of the remarks in Parliament of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain who said ” In appraising recent events it is necessary to face facts, however we may judge them, however we may anticipate that they will react upon the international position as it exists to- day. The hard fact is–and of its truth every hon. Member can judge for himself–that nothing could have arrested this action by Germany unless we and others with us had been prepared to use force to prevent it.

I imagine that according to the temperament of the individual the events which are in our minds to-day will be the cause of regret, of sorrow, perhaps of indignation. They cannot be regarded by His Majesty’s Government with indifference or equanimity. They are bound to have effects which cannot yet be measured. The immediate result must be to intensify the sense of uncertainty and insecurity in Europe. Unfortunately, while the policy of appeasement would lead to a relaxation of the economic pressure under which many countries are suffering to-day, what has just occurred must inevitably retard economic recovery and, indeed, increased care will be required to ensure that marked deterioration does not set in.

This is not a moment for hasty decisions or for careless words. We must consider the new situation quickly, but with cool judgment. . . . As regards our defense programs, we have always made it clear that they were flexible and that they would have to be reviewed from time to time in the light of any development in the international situation. It would be idle to pretend that recent events do not constitute a change of the kind that we had in mind. Accordingly we have decided to make a fresh review, and in due course we shall announce what further steps we may think it necessary to take.”

 Pathetic as this response undoubtedly was, I am reluctant to pile on poor Neville Chamberlain. Other political leaders have taken their countries to war, death and ruin simply on the grounds that it would have been embarrassing to back down. I am not sure that the willingness to endure “humiliation” in an effort to preserve peace is a fault we want to condemn without reservation. In retrospect standing up to Hitler was a course which was both feasible and correct. However, estimating your strength relative to the enemy remains an error prone exercise to this day and Chamberlain got no support for a strong stand from his military, his political allies or other countries. Chamberlain, a man who loyally served in Churchill’s cabinet in 1940, had the misfortune to be the wrong man in the wrong job at the wrong time.