The Imperial Japanese Army

When you consider the Japanese army of 1937 the first concept that should come to mind is modernization. The Japanese army went from the technological equivalent of the 17th century in 1867 to the point of defeating the Tsarist Russian army in the Russo - Japanese war of 1904-1905 . It was the Russians under a backward imperial regime and the Russians were at the end of a long Siberian supply line but it was still a monumental achievement.

This voluntary act of wrenching modernization was still under way in 1937 but the Japanese army was falling behind Japan’s Navy and its Air Force in the modernization race. Still, they were more than a match for the Chinese in a stand up fight and this was both a blessing and a curse since being more than a match for the Chinese did not prepare them for the Russians in 1938 and 1939. Even less were they ready for the Americans in 1941-45, a reformed British army in 1944-45, and a Russian army fresh off its victory over the Germans in 1945.

The Japanese army of the 1930’s was no more than in the middle of the pack of major powers. Their strength was in their infantry which possessed a martial spirit, a capacity for enduring physical hardship and a 99% basic literacy rate. This last meant that both instruction and indoctrination could be in writing.

Japanese soldiers were told that war was the highest expression of culture and civilization. They were also told “Fight hard. If you are afraid of dying you will die in battle; if you are not afraid, you will not die.” This was an all too simplistic version of the advice to the Samurai of the pregunpowder era that your best chance of survival was to suppress your fear of death which could only hinder you and concentrate on fighting technique to insure victory and survival. Finally they were instructed “Under no circumstances become a straggler or a prisoner of war. In case you become helpless, commit suicide nobly.”

The Japanese army was always a little short in the quality of its equipment. Bolt action rifles, machine guns that fired more slowly, smaller amounts of artillery, lighter caliber artillery; these were the consistent patterns compared with the better European armies. One area where they did excel was mortars and light field guns for direct fire support. This helped them a lot in their battles in Southeast Asia in 1941-42.

Two areas where they fell short in absolute terms were armor and antiaircraft artillery. In armor they were perhaps on a par or even slightly behind the Italians. They formed their first tank company in 1931, their first tank brigade in 1934 and a total of four armored divisions during the war. Even the Italians formed five armored divisions and more regularly employed their armored and motorized troops in concentrated groups.

With rare exceptions the Japanese employed their tanks in small groups in direct support of their infantry. They had very limited quantities of antiaircraft artillery. Conditions in China provided no incentive for improving either of these circumstances.

In terms of numbers the Japanese army in July of 1937 numbered 462, 000. This translated into 17 divisions in China plus units in Japan and Korea. The Japanese also possessed 1.5 million fully trained reserves and an additional 2.5 million partially trained. These were rapidly called upon as the war in China expanded. By the time of Pearl Harbor the Japanese had 35 of 51 divisions in China as well as 38 of 39 independent brigades.

The relatively small number of Japanese troops initially in China is made even more clear when you consider that the Japanese army viewed the Soviet Union as a major threat and kept the elite units of its Kwantung army ready to fight the Soviets if necessary. Japanese reservists did the larger share of the fighting in the North China campaigns and gained experience for future battles. This fact also supports the case that the Japanese did not possess a master plan for conquest at the start of the war with China. Rather they allowed themselves to be drawn in by a series of incremental decisions and non-decisions. This is not a good way to run a war or conduct a foreign policy as subsequent events were to show.

Battle of Shanghai Begins

My sources do not agree exactly on cause and effect. However, it is clear that the Japanese behaved provocatively; ostentatiously landing their reinforcements and , according to some sources, issuing new demands for Chinese withdrawal from the city. Although some say the Japanese attacked first it is clear that the Chinese weren’t going to wait for more Japanese troops to arrive. The first two of Chiang’s German trained divisions, the 87th and 88th, were immediately committed. More were on their way. The Chinese also committed their very limited and thus very precious tank and aircraft assets.

To the extent that the Japanese provoked this, it was a strategic mistake. Faced with an opponent that had trouble deciding to attack and still more trouble with execution they may have started something earlier rather than later in a situation where they were outnumbered and could have used more time to strengthen their position.

However, with the passage of time it increasingly appears that the Japanese actions were largely irrelevant to the issue of who started it. Time was not working in China’s favor and Chiang Kai-shek had little choice politically or militarily but to take the initiative and attack.

For an interesting account of the battle, the underlying strategy and the results take a look at this wikipedia article . It is a work in progress and I think I see a primarily Chinese perspective but it is informative and consistent with my other sources and the logic of events.

Incident at Hongqiao Airport

On this day one of two things happened. A Japanese lieutenant and his driver were driving by the Hongqiao airport west of Shanghai minding their own business when they were confronted by Chinese militia men who ordered them to move on. Complying with this unwarranted order could be seen as a sign of weakness so the lieutenant refused. Letting such a refusal stand could be seen as a sign of weakness so the Chinese militia shot them both.Or - the Japanese lieutenant and his driver tried to force their way into the airport and shot a militia man who tried to stop them and the rest of the militia fired in self defense.

Both sides protested furiously and put the bodies of the dead on display to reinforce their respective claims. Both sides agreed to refer the matter to diplomatic channels but each side made further military preparations that the other denounced as a provocation.

Chiang Makes His Move

On this day, seventy years ago, the Chinese National Defense Council declared a “War of Resistance” against Japan. Again, this need not be considered an official declaration of war such that President Roosevelt would be forced to apply the neutrality act.

However, in the north where Peking and Tientsin are now Japanese occupied the war is a hot one. The Chinese are withdrawing southward over flat terrain where the Japanese can use their tanks and other modern weapons to maximum advantage. By withdrawing they blunt the impact of this Japanese advantage trading space for time.

But what is Chiang going to use this time for? The Japanese are actually quite content to keep the conflict confined to the north where their supply lines are established and the terrain is favorable. In contrast the Chinese would prefer to take the initiative and to fight closer to their own supply lines in relatively broken terrain with substantial urban areas. Shanghai fits this bill nicely.

While fighting has not broken out in Shanghai, the Japanese have around 9,000 troops there protecting a Japanese civilian community of 25,000. Japanese reinforcements are on the way. The Chinese have about 50,000 men at Shanghai and Chiang has ordered his local commanders there to prepare to drive the Japanese out of Shanghai.

The Japanese are not pushing things at Shanghai right now - at least by the standards of the times - but the Chinese are committed to a course of total resistance and the Japanese forces at Shanghai will only get stronger and make correspondingly more aggressive demands.